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Abstract
We present evidence on the interplay between social connections, incentives, and productivity in the workplace. We address three questions — (i) whether and how social connections
between workers and managers aﬀect the performance of connected workers; (ii) whether and
how they aﬀect overall firm performance; and, (iii) whether the eﬀect of social connections
depends on the strength of managerial incentives. We identify these eﬀects by combining
panel data on individual worker’s productivity from personnel records with a natural field
experiment in which we engineered an exogenous change in managerial incentives from fixed
wages to performance pay conditional on workers’ average productivity. We find that when
managers are paid fixed wages, they favor workers to whom they are socially connected, but
when they are paid performance bonuses they do not. Although the favoritism generated
by social connections increases the performance of connected workers, we show that favoring
connected workers is not optimal for the firm’s overall performance.
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Introduction

This paper explores the eﬀects of social relationships between individuals within a firm, on individual and firm performance. The idea that human relations aﬀect performance in the workplace
has been long discussed in the sociology literature (Mayo 1933, Barnard 1938, Roethlisberger and
Dickson 1939, and Roy 1952). Economists have joined this debate relatively recently, due both
to the burgeoning theoretical literature on how social relations and social preferences matter for
economic behavior, and the increasing availability of personnel data.
In the context of firms, much of the literature — theoretical and empirical — has studied the
eﬀects of social relations within one tier of the firm hierarchy, such as among managers, or among
workers.1 However it is reasonable to expect that such social connections might also span across
layers of the hierarchy, in particular between managers and workers, and that this is likely to have
important consequences for individual and firm performance, the optimal design of compensation
schemes, and the structure of organizations (Prendergast and Topel 1996).2
In general, social connections between managers and workers can help or harm firm performance. On the one hand, social connections may be beneficial to firm performance if they allow
managers to provide non-monetary incentives to workers, or help reduce informational asymmetries within the firm. On the other hand, managers may display favoritism towards workers they
are socially connected with, to the detriment of other workers and overall firm performance.3
To the extent that social connections aﬀect firm performance, there may be important interactions between the compensation scheme for managers and the extent to which social connections
are exploited. For example, as managerial compensation becomes more closely tied to firm performance, we would expect managers to utilize social connections to a greater extent if indeed, such
connections are beneficial for firm performance.
This paper presents empirical evidence on the interplay between social connections, managerial
incentives, and workers’ performance. In particular we present evidence to identify — (i) whether
social connections between workers and managers aﬀect the performance of connected workers;
1

Lazear (1989), Kandel and Lazear (1992), and Rotemberg (1994) develop models incorporating social concerns
into the analysis of behavior within firms. While they emphasize that individuals have social concerns for others at
the same tier of the firm hierarchy, their analysis is equally applicable across tiers of the hierarchy. Bewley (1999)
oﬀers extensive evidence from interviews with managers arguing that their concerns over fair outcomes for workers
and the morale of employees are important determinants of their behavior.
2
A related theoretical literature emphasizes the ineﬃciencies that arise from collusion between managers and
workers (Tirole 1986, Kofman and Lawarrée 1993), influence activities, and other forms of rent seeking behavior
by workers (Milgrom 1988, Milgrom and Roberts 1990).
3
Both the positive and negative eﬀects of social connections have been stressed in the organizational behavior
and sociology literatures. Examples of such work includes that on the eﬀect of manager-subordinate similarity on
subjective outcomes such as performance evaluations, role ambiguity, and job satisfaction (Tsui and O’Reilly 1989,
Thomas 1990, Wesolowski and Mossholder 1997), and on how social networks within the firm influence within firm
promotions (Podolny and Baron 1997).
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(ii) whether the eﬀect of social connections depends on the strength of managerial incentives; and,
(iii) whether social connections between managers and some workers are detrimental to the firm’s
overall performance.
To address these questions we combine personnel data on workers’ productivity with a natural
field experiment in which we engineered an exogenous change in the managerial incentive scheme
from fixed wages to performance pay based on the average productivity of managed workers.
The firm we study is a leading producer of soft fruit in the United Kingdom. We focus on the
behavior of individuals at two tiers of the firm hierarchy — workers and managers. The main task
of the workers is to pick fruit, whereas managers are responsible for logistics. Two key features
of this setting are that workers are paid piece rates and that managerial eﬀort is complementary
to worker eﬀort and can be targeted to individual workers. Taken together, these features imply
that managers can aﬀect a worker’s productivity and hence his earnings.
Managers and workers are all hired for one picking season. They are university students from
eight Eastern European countries and are thus of similar ages and backgrounds. In addition, they
live on the farm site for the entire duration of their stay. Both features increase the likelihood of
managers and workers forming strong social connections with each other.
To measure social connections we exploit three sources of similarity between managers and
workers — whether they are of the same nationality, whether they live in close proximity to each
other on the farm, and whether they arrived at a similar time on the farm. Our underlying
assumption is that individuals are more likely to befriend others if they are of the same nationality,
if they are neighbors, or if they share early experiences in a new workplace.
To identify the eﬀect of social connections on connected workers and on the firm as a whole
we exploit two sources of variation. First, the nature of production in our setting is such that
the allocation of workers to managers changes daily. We exploit this quasi-random variation to
identify the eﬀect of social connections from the comparison of the performance of a given worker
on days when he is socially connected to his manager, to days when he is not. Exploiting the
within worker variation allows us to separate the eﬀect of social connections from the eﬀect of
unobservable individual traits, for example ability, that make workers more likely to befriend
managers and to have higher performance regardless of social connections.
Similarly, as we observe the same manager managing both workers she is socially connected
to and workers she is not connected to, we are also able to control for time invariant sources
of unobserved manager heterogeneity that aﬀect the productivity of connected and unconnected
workers alike, such as their management style or motivational skills.4
Second, we designed and implemented a field experiment to exogenously vary the strength of
4

Our empirical strategy is informed by the evidence that individual ‘styles’ of managers aﬀect firm performance
over and above firm level characteristics themselves (Bertrand and Schoar 2003, Malmendier and Tate 2005).
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managerial incentives. In the experiment we changed the managerial compensation scheme from
fixed wages to the same level of fixed wages plus a performance bonus that is increasing in the
average productivity of the workers on the field that day. Workers were paid according to the
same compensation scheme — piece rates — throughout.
The experiment allows us to identify whether and how the eﬀect of social connections between
the same managers and workers changes once managers are given performance pay and thus
provides an ideal counterfactual to assess the eﬀect of social connections on the overall firm’s
performance. To be precise, if the managers’ behavior towards connected workers changes once
their interests are more closely aligned with the firm’s, their previous behavior under fixed wages
could have not been maximizing the firm’s average productivity.
Our main findings are as follows. First, when managers are paid fixed wages, the productivity
of a given worker is significantly higher on days when he is assigned to managers he is socially
connected to. The magnitudes of our estimates imply that the productivity of a given worker is
9.5% higher when he is socially connected to his manager, relative to when he is not, all else equal.
As workers are paid piece rates, this translates into the same proportionate change in earnings.
Hence when managers face low powered incentives, they favor workers they are socially connected
to, and this has qualitatively and quantitatively significant eﬀects on the individual performance
of connected workers.
Second, when managers are paid performance bonuses that tie their pay to the average productivity of workers they manage, being socially connected to the manager has no eﬀect on the
worker’s productivity. In short, when managers’ interests are aligned with those of the firm and
their pay is tied to average productivity, they change their behavior and do not favor workers they
are socially connected to.
The fact that the diﬀerence-in-diﬀerence in worker productivity by social connectivity to his
managers and managerial incentive scheme is positive indicates that, in this setting, favoring
socially connected workers is not optimal for the firm’s average productivity.
Third, we find the eﬀect of social connections on the productivity of a given worker is stronger
when fewer of his co-workers are also socially connected to the manager. This suggests that favors
are a rival good in the sense that favoring one worker limits the ability of the manager to favor
other workers also present on the field. This finding sheds light on the mechanism that links
the existence of social connections across tiers of the firm hierarchy to overall firm performance.
Indeed, if by favoring a connected worker the manager is unable to devote eﬀort towards an
unconnected worker who is of higher ability, the average firm productivity might fall overall.
Our paper contributes to the growing empirical evidence on the interplay between social networks and individual and firm performance. This literature has explored how the response of
workers to incentives depends on their social connections with their co-workers at the same tier of
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the firm hierarchy (Bandiera et al 2005a), and how the demographic diﬀerences between managers
and their subordinates aﬀect the subordinates’ rate of quits, dismissals and promotions (Giuliano
et al 2005). Another branch of this literature has explored the eﬀects of the CEO or managerial
board of firms being socially connected to those outside of the firm such as local politicians and
bureaucrats (Bertrand et al 2005, Kramarz and Thesmar 2005, Mian and Khwaja 2005).5 6
Methodologically, our paper provides a contribution in linking the benefits of natural field
experiments (Harrison and List 2004) with the insights gained from ‘insider econometric’ analysis
of firms (Ichniowski and Shaw 2003). Such an approach allows us to present evidence on whether
social connections between managers and workers result in favoritism for a given set of managerial
incentives, and how favoritism is aﬀected by an exogenous change in managerial incentives. This
in turn allows us to infer whether the existence of social connections is good or bad for firm
performance, and shed light on the potentially optimal form of managerial compensation scheme.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes our context and experimental research
design. Section 3 develops a theoretical framework to highlight the central forces at play when
social connections can have potentially positive and negative eﬀects on worker productivity. Section 4 describes the data, empirical method, and identifying assumptions. Section 5 presents the
main results and robustness checks. Section 6 concludes with a discussion of the external validity
of our findings. Proofs and further robustness checks are in the Appendix.

2

The Context and Experimental Design

2.1

Context

We analyze the behavior of managers and workers in the fruit picking division of a leading UK
producer of soft fruit during the 2003 season. Workers and managers are hired from eight countries
in Eastern Europe on seasonal contracts that last between three and six months.7 To be recruited,
individuals must be full-time university students, and have at least one year remaining before
graduation. Two features of the work environment increase the likelihood of individuals forming
strong social connections to each other — (i) workers and managers are of similar ages and have
5

In non firm settings, Garicano et al (2005) present evidence from soccer matches on how referees favor home
teams in order to satisfy the crowds in the stadium. Laband and Piette (1994) show that journal editors use professional contacts to identify high impact papers. In that context favoritism thus reduces informational asymmetries
and is eﬃciency enhancing in the market for scientific knowledge.
6
Fehr and Fischbacher (2002) provide an overview of the laboratory evidence on social preferences in workplace
environments. One branch of this stems from Akerlof (1982) and Akerlof and Yellen (1988) who view the labor
relation as a partial gift exchange. A separate branch of this experimental literature presents evidence that workers
care about their pay relative to other workers (Charness and Kuhn 2005).
7
Their work permit allows them to work on other UK farms subject to the approval of the permit agency. Their
outside option to employment at the farm is therefore to return home or to move to another farm during the season.
Few workers are hired for consecutive seasons and workers are not typically hired from the local labor market.
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similar socioeconomic backgrounds; (ii) they live and work on the farm site for the entire duration
of their stay, which on average is 100 days.
The workers’ primary task is to pick fruit. They typically pick on two or three diﬀerent fields
each day. At the start of a field-day the manager allocates each worker to a row of fruit to be
picked. Once a worker clears this row, the manager is responsible for reallocating the worker to
another row within the field. This process continues until all fruit within the field is picked. As
each worker picks on his own row, his productivity is independent of the eﬀorts of other workers
on the same field-day, so that there are no complementarities between workers arising from the
production technology. Workers do not choose how many hours to work — all workers are present
on the field-day for the number of hours it takes to pick all the available fruit. The only choice
variable of workers is how much eﬀort to exert into picking.8
Workers are paid a piece rate per kilogram of fruit picked. Each worker’s pay is thus related
to his productivity, which is an increasing function of his eﬀort, the quantity of fruit available on
the rows he is assigned, and of the managerial eﬀort targeted towards him.
Managers are each assigned a group of around twenty workers, and their task is to organize the
field logistics for this group. Managers on the same field focus on their assigned group of workers
and work independently of each other. Field logistics include the allocation of workers to rows
and organizing the movement of fruit from the field to the packaging plant.9
The key choice variables of each manager are the allocation of workers to rows, and the allocation of eﬀort among her workers. Managers are responsible for allocating workers to rows at
the start of the field-day, and for reallocating workers to new rows once they have finished picking
the row they were originally assigned to. How the manager matches workers to rows is important
because there is considerable variation in the quantity of fruit across rows within a field. Some of
this is due to the natural variation in fruit quantity on diﬀerent plants. This variation also stems
from some rows being closer to pillars that support the plastic covering over the field. Rows close
to pillars are harder to pick, air circulation is worse, and hence heat tends to accumulate. These
factors reduce the marginal productivity of worker’s eﬀort in these rows, other things equal.
The manager chooses how to allocate her eﬀort across workers along two dimensions. First,
if several workers finish picking their rows at the same time the manager has to decide whom
to reallocate to a new row first. Second, workers place the fruit they have picked into crates.
Once these are full, managers have to ensure that new empty crates are provided to workers and
that full crates are removed from the field and shipped to the packaging plant. If several workers
8

Work is oﬀered on a casual basis with no daily guarantee of employment. In practice, managers manage
each day, and workers are engaged in picking tasks every other day. On other days workers are asked to perform
non-picking tasks such as planting or weeding, or may be left unemployed for the day.
9
A separate group of individuals, called field runners, are responsible for physically moving fruit from the field
to the packaging plant. They do not themselves pick fruit nor do they manage workers.

6

simultaneously fill their crates, the manager chooses whom to help first.
The eﬀort costs to the manager are considerable because the workers she is responsible for are
dispersed over a large area. The median field size in our sample is three hectares, and given there
are typically three managers present, each has to cover an area of one hectare. To make sure she
is aware of which workers need to be reallocated to new rows and which need their crates to be
replaced, the manager needs to continuously walk around the field.
In this environment, managerial eﬀort is complementary to worker’s eﬀort, namely, for a given
eﬀort level of the worker, his productivity is higher the more eﬀort the manager targets towards
him. For example, a manager can increase a worker’s productivity by assigning him to more
plentiful rows and removing his full crates quickly.10 The eﬀect of managerial eﬀort on worker
productivity can be substantial. Assuming that workers pick at a constant speed, if the manager
slacks for five minutes every hour and a worker is left to wait for a new crate for the same time,
his productivity would be 5/60=8% lower.
Social connections between managers and workers can have two eﬀects. First, if a manager
is concerned about the pay of the workers she is socially connected to, she can allocate more of
her eﬀort towards them thus increasing their productivity and their earnings. Second, a manager
might be better informed about the ability or skills of workers she is socially connected to or be
able to exert stronger social pressure on them to work hard, both of which generate a diﬀerence
in the allocation of managerial eﬀort between connected and unconnected workers.
We now discuss the two important features of this work environment that allow us to assess
whether social connections shape the managers’ eﬀort allocation choice and, as a consequence,
workers’ earnings, and how this depends on the compensation scheme in place for managers.

2.2

Key Feature 1: Natural Variation

The quantity of fruit available for picking varies across fields on any given day because fields vary
in their physical size, and within a field over time because plants reach maturity at diﬀerent times.
The fruit is planted some years in advance, so the quantity of fruit to be picked is given. The
order in which fields are picked is decided at the start of the season.
This natural variation implies that the demand and supply of picking labor varies across
field-days. Hence the number of workers and managers on the field diﬀers across field-days.
While farm management ensures the ratio of managers to workers is held constant, this natural
variation implies the same worker can be supervised by diﬀerent managers on diﬀerent field-days.
Importantly for our study, a worker can be supervised by a manager he is socially connected to
10

Managerial and worker eﬀort are not substitutes because managers themselves never pick fruit. Over the
season, individuals are not observed moving across tiers of the hierarchy from picking tasks to managerial tasks or
vice versa.
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on some field-days, and by another manager that he is not socially connected to on others.
Neither managers nor workers choose which field to work on or whom they work with. Rather,
they are allocated to fields by a higher-tier employee, whom we refer to as the chief operating
oﬃcer (COO), and is a permanent employee of the farm. The allocation of workers and managers
to fields is made on the basis of the quantity of fruit to be picked on diﬀerent fields that day, and
the demand for non-picking tasks such as planting and weeding.
In Section 4 we present the underlying assumptions that allow us to exploit this quasi-random
source of variation to identify the eﬀects of social connections in the workplace. In the Appendix
we present evidence directly related to these identifying assumptions.

2.3

Key Feature 2: The Experimental Research Design

We designed and implemented a field experiment in which we exogenously changed the compensation scheme of managers. At the start of the 2003 season, managers were paid a fixed wage.
Midway through the 2003 season, we added a performance bonus to the same level of fixed wages.
The experiment left the compensation scheme of the workers unchanged — workers were paid piece
rates throughout the 2003 season.11
The bonus payment was awarded on field f and day t if the workers average productivity
on the field-day, Y f t , exceeded an exogenously fixed threshold, Y ∗ .12 Conditional on reaching
the threshold, the total monetary value of the bonus payment available to the managers, B(Y f t )
increases at an increasing rate in the average field-day productivity.13 Each manager then obtains
an equal share of the bonus payment generated on the field-day. If there are Mf t managers present,
each obtains a payment of M1f t B(Y f t ).
11

The change in incentives aﬀected both the managers and the COO. The change was announced to the COO
and managers a week in advance of the actual change. During this week, we spent time going through numerical
examples with management to make sure they understood how the performance bonus would be calculated. Workers
were not informed of the change in managerial compensation, but given that managers and workers live on the
farm, they are likely to have understood the change over time.
12
To avoid multi-tasking concerns (Holmstrom and Milgrom 1991), the performance bonus was not awarded if
the quality of fruit picking declined. Quality is measured in two ways. First is simply the quantity of damaged
fruit. Second, fruit has to be classified as either suitable for market or supermarket. This classification is largely
based on the size of each fruit. If the percentage of damaged or misclassified fruit rose by more than 2% of a
pre-established norm, then the performance bonus was not awarded that field-day.
13
The bonus payment schedule is piecewise linear;
⎧
0
if Y ∗ > Y f t
⎪
⎪
⎨
a1 + b1 Y f t if Y ∗ + c1 > Y f t ≥ Y ∗
B(Y f t ) =
a + b2 Y f t if Y ∗ + c2 > Y f t ≥ Y ∗ + c1
⎪
⎪
⎩ 2
a3 + b3 Y f t if Y f t > Y ∗ + c2
where ai , bi and ci are constants such that a3 < a2 < a1 , b3 > b2 > b1 , c2 > c1 . This reflects the fact that the
marginal cost of supplying managerial eﬀort is increasing. The parameters ai , bi , and ci are set such that B(Y f t )
is a continuous and convex function. The values of ai , bi , ci , and Y ∗ cannot be provided due to confidentiality.
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The fraction of field-days on which the bonus was earned varies from 20 to 50% across managers.
The ex post monetary value of the performance bonus to managers is substantial. Averaged
across all field-days actually worked under the bonus, managerial hourly earnings increased by
7%. Conditional on obtaining the bonus, managerial hourly earnings increased by 25%. The true
expected hourly earnings increase to managers of the performance bonus scheme lies between these
two bounds.14
The managers were unaware they were taking part in an experiment and that the data would
be used for scientific research. As such, our experiment is a natural field experiment according to
the taxonomy of Harrison and List (2004). The managers were however aware that productivity
data were recorded and kept by the farm owner, and that the data would be analyzed to improve
the firms’ overall eﬃciency.
To identify whether managers allocate more eﬀort to workers they are socially connected to, we
compare the productivity of the same worker on field-days in which he is socially connected to his
manager, to his productivity on field-days in which he is not socially connected to his manager. We
exploit the exogenous variation in managerial incentives our research design provides to identify
whether the eﬀects of social connections depend on the managerial incentive scheme in place. The
comparison also allows us to establish whether social connections are beneficial or detrimental to
the firm’s overall performance.

3

Theoretical Framework

We develop a stylized model of the behavior of managers and workers to analyze the eﬀect of
social connections across tiers of the firm’s hierarchy, on the productivity of connected workers
and the firm’s overall performance. Our aim is to determine whether social connections can aﬀect
worker and firm performance in equilibrium, and how the eﬀect of social connections depends
on the strength of managerial incentives. The model is tailored to fit our particular context and
experimental design and to highlight the main economic forces at play.

3.1

Technology, Preferences, and Incentives

For parsimony and without loss of generality, we assume production requires one manager and two
workers in any given field. Workers pick fruit, and the manager organizes logistics for each worker.
The output of worker i is given by yi = (1 + ki mi )ei , where ei is his eﬀort, mi is the managerial
14

Given that — (i) managers are from Eastern Europe; (ii) their base pay is 20% higher than the UK minimum
wage; (iii) most individuals save earnings to spend later in their home country, these increases in hourly earnings
translate into large increases in real income. As of January 2003, gross monthly earnings at the UK minimum wage
(∈1105) are 5 times as high as at the minimum wage in Poland (∈201), where 40% of managers come from, and
almost 20 times higher than in Bulgaria (∈56), where 30% of managers come from.
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eﬀort targeted towards him, and ki > 0 is a measure of the strength of the complementarity
between the manager’s and worker’s eﬀorts. To make matters concrete, the managerial eﬀort
directed towards a worker can be thought of as the eﬀort devoted to ensuring worker i is allocated
a new row of fruit as soon as he is done picking the current one.
The productivity of worker i, measured as the kilograms of fruit picked per hour, is defined as
yi /h, where h is the number of hours worked on the field. This is the same for all workers in the
field and so we make the simplifying assumption that h = 1. This implies that in our framework
output and productivity coincide.
Workers are paid a piece rate β > 0 per kilogram fruit picked, and is taken as given by workers.
This is also the same for all workers in the field and so we make the simplifying assumption that
= yi . Worker i has a disutility of eﬀort of
β = 1. The total pay of worker i is therefore pW
i
1
2
θ e , where θi captures the heterogeneity across workers, and is interpreted as the inverse of the
2 i i
worker’s innate ability. The utility of a worker is assumed to be linear and additively separable
between pay, yi , and eﬀort, − 12 θi e2i .
P
The manager’s compensation schedule is pM = f +bY , where f is a fixed wage and Y = 12 i yi
is the average productivity of her subordinates. The parameter b ≥ 0 captures the strength of
managerial incentives, namely the variable component of managerial pay which is linearly related
to average worker productivity. We assume the manager has one unit of eﬀort available and
P
chooses how to allocate it between the workers such that i mi = 1. This assumption allows us to
highlight how the manager’s allocation of eﬀort across workers changes with her incentive scheme,
while holding constant her overall eﬀort. Allowing the manager to also choose her level of eﬀort
leaves the qualitative results unchanged.
Social Connections
Social connections can aﬀect, in reduced form, both the preferences of the agents, and the
production technology. To capture the former channel we follow Prendergast and Topel (1996),
and model social connections by assuming the manager’s utility depends on her pay and the pay
of her subordinates, that is,
X
σ i pW
(1)
uM = pM +
i ,
i

where σ i measures the social connection between the manager and worker i. We assume that
σ i = σ > 0 if worker i is connected to the manager while σ i = 0 if he is not.15 The preferences
in (1) can be seen to represent “altruism” but also as the reduced form of a model in which the
manager cares about the connected workers’ earnings because she receives kickbacks from them.
15

We focus on whether managers and workers are socially connected or not, rather than on the strength of the
social connection. What matters for the analysis is that managers may be connected to a greater extent to some
workers than others. We also focus on the case in which σ ≥ 0. A negative weight could be interpreted as the
manger being spiteful towards the worker.
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To the extent that social connections ameliorate the moral hazard problem between the manager and the workers, they aﬀect workers’ productivity directly. This would also be the case if
social connections foster cooperation or improve communication between managers and workers
in the workplace. To capture this second channel we assume the strength of the complementarity
between managerial and worker eﬀort depends on their social connections, that is given worker i’s
productivity, yi = (1 + ki mi )ei , we assume ki = k > 1 if worker i is connected to the manager,
namely if σi = σ, while ki = 1 if he is not.

3.2

The Workers’ Eﬀort Choice

Each worker chooses his eﬀort taking managerial eﬀort as given. Note that workers’ eﬀort aﬀects
average productivity and hence the manager’s pay when b > 0, which raises the issue of whether
the workers’ utility should depend on the manager’s as well as their pay when workers and the
manager are socially connected. In practice, however, each manager supervises twenty workers.
Hence each worker’s contribution to average productivity and therefore his eﬀect on the manager’s
pay is trivial. Given that workers’ utility is linear and additively separable in their own pay, yi ,
and cost of eﬀort, − 12 θi e2i , worker i’s optimal eﬀort choice then is,
e∗i =

(1 + ki mi )
.
θi

(2)

Workers optimally exert more eﬀort when the managerial eﬀort targeted towards them increases because managerial and worker eﬀort are complementary in the production technology. In
addition, eﬀort is decreasing in θi , so high ability workers optimally exert more eﬀort than low
ability workers, other things equal.
To make the managerial allocation problem more stark, we assume that the diﬀerence in ability
between the workers is suﬃciently large so that if the manager were socially connected to neither
worker, one worker always exerts more eﬀort than the other, regardless of whom is targeted by
the manager. We denote the high ability worker by h and the low ability worker by l. Formally,16
Assumption 1: The ability parameters (θl , θh ) are such that θl > 2θh , so that worker h’s
eﬀort is higher than worker l’s for any (ml , mh ).
16

This assumption also implies that the high ability worker would always exert more eﬀort irrespective of whom
the manager targets, if the manager were only connected to him or to both workers. The assumption simplifies
the analysis by removing regions of the parameter space where there are multiple equilibria for the manager and
workers’ eﬀort choices in the case where the manager is not socially connected to either worker.
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3.3

The Manager’s Allocation Choice

In our context it is reasonable to assume that the manager observes workers’ ability but cannot
commit to the allocation of eﬀort ex ante. It then follows that the manager takes the workers’
eﬀort choices as given and chooses to allocate her eﬀort between workers h and l to solve the
following problem,
W
(3)
max uM = pM (ml , mh ) + σ l pW
l (ml ) + σ h ph (mh ),
ml , mh

subject to ml + mh = 1. Substituting for the manager’s pay, the workers’ pay, and ml + mh = 1,
the manager’s problem can be re-written as,
max f +
ml

µ

¶
¶
µ
b
b
+ σ l (1 + kl ml )el +
+ σ h (1 + kh (1 − ml ))eh
2
2

(4)

The linear structure of (4) implies a corner solution so that the manager will allocate all her
eﬀort to either worker l or h, depending on which yields the highest marginal return.17 The
¢
¡
marginal benefit of targeting worker l is equal to 2b + σ l kl el whereas the marginal benefit of
¢
¡
targeting worker h is 2b + σ h kh eh . Assumption 1 guarantees that when the manager is connected
to neither worker, el < eh regardless of the manager’s eﬀort choice and this implies that, other
things equal, the manager will target the high ability worker. However, diﬀerences in the social
connections between the manager and the two workers, captured by σ i and ki , may cause the
manager to target the low ability worker instead.
In addition, the managerial targeting choice depends directly on the strength of incentives b
and, in equilibrium, also depends on the workers’ ability θi , through the workers’ eﬀort choices
given by (2). We characterize the solution to the manager’s maximization problem in the following
two Propositions.
Proposition 1: If the manager is socially connected to the high ability worker only, to neither worker, or to both of them, she targets the high ability worker regardless of the strength of
incentives.
Intuitively, when the manager is connected to neither worker, or equally connected to both,
social connections do not alter the ranking due to natural ability diﬀerences between the two
workers. In this case, as the manager cares equally about the earnings of both workers, she
will chose whom to target to maximize average productivity and hence her pay. Given that the
complementarity between managerial and worker eﬀort is equally strong for both workers, the only
diﬀerence between the two is that worker h is naturally more able and puts in more eﬀort regardless
of the manager’s choice. Hence targeting worker h is a dominant strategy for the manager.
17
This property would of course be retained if the manager also choose the level of her eﬀort and not only its
allocation across workers.
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When the manager is connected to the high ability worker only, the ability diﬀerential, the
complementarity diﬀerential, and the social preferences of the manager, all make the marginal
return of targeting worker h higher than the marginal return of targeting worker l.
On the other hand, when the low ability worker is socially connected whereas the high ability
worker is not, the manager faces a trade-oﬀ between targeting the worker she is connected to and
the worker whose productivity is highest. The terms of the trade-oﬀ depend on the strength of
social connections and of incentives, as given by the next result.
Proposition 2: If the manager is socially connected to the low ability worker, she targets him
if the eﬀect of social connections on the complementarity between managerial and worker eﬀort is
suﬃciently strong, if the weight the manager puts on the connected worker earnings is suﬃciently
high, or if managerial incentives are suﬃciently low powered.
¢
¡
The solution is illustrated in Figure 1 in σb , k space. In the top right hand corner, the unique
equilibrium is such that the manager targets her eﬀort towards the connected worker l, that is
(ml = 1, mh = 0). Intuitively, this occurs when managerial incentives are low powered (b low)
and the eﬀect of social connections either on productivity or on the manager’s payoﬀ is strong (
k high, σ high).
At the other extreme, in the bottom left hand side corner, the unique equilibrium is such that
the manager targets all her eﬀort towards the high ability worker, that is (ml = 0, mh = 1).
Intuitively, this occurs when managerial incentives are high powered (b is high) and the eﬀect
of social connections either on productivity or on the manager’s payoﬀ is weak ( k low, σ low).
Finally in the intermediate range of parameters, the manager does not have a dominant strategy
and both allocations of managerial eﬀort are equilibria as the manager’s action is the best response
to the workers’ choices and vice versa.18

3.4

The Manager’s Choice versus the Productivity Maximizing Choice

We now show that social connections can increase, decrease, or leave the firms’ productivity unchanged depending on the strength of the complementarity between the manager’s and connected
worker’s eﬀort, which workers are connected, and the strength of managerial incentives.
Proposition 3: The existence of social connections increase the firm’s overall productivity
if the manager is connected to the high ability worker or if the eﬀect of social connections on
the complementarity between the manager’s and the connected worker’s eﬀort (ki ) is suﬃciently
strong. When the manager is only connected to the low ability worker and the eﬀect of social
18

Note that if the manager could commit to an allocation ex ante and hence internalize the eﬀect of her actions
on workers’ eﬀort choice, this region would disappear as the manager would choose the allocation that maximizes
her utility.
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connections on the complementarity is weak, the existence of social connections weakly decrease
the firm’s productivity.
When the manager is socially connected to both workers or only to the high ability worker,
the firm’s productivity is maximized when the manager targets the high ability worker. From
Proposition 1 it follows that in this case, the manager’s and the firm’s interests are aligned, as the
manager’s utility is also maximized by targeting the high ability worker. The existence of social
connections makes the complementarity between managerial and worker eﬀort stronger, which
increases productivity both directly, and indirectly by increasing the worker’s chosen eﬀort.
When the manager is socially connected to the low ability worker, targeting the low ability
worker maximizes average productivity if and only if (1 + k)2 > 1 + 3 θθhl , namely if the relative
strength of the complementarity between the manager and the connected worker is strong enough
to overcome the fact that the connected worker is of lower ability ( θθhl > 1).
In Figure 1, the productivity maximizing choice is illustrated by the vertical line at (1 + k)2 =
1 + 3 θθhl . Figure 1 thus shows that when the complementarity is strong, that is to the right of the
line, targeting worker l maximizes average productivity and the existence of social connections
is good for the firm. When the complementarity is weak, however, there are cases in which the
manager chooses to target the low ability worker, whereas targeting the high ability worker would
lead to higher average productivity. This is more likely to happen when managerial incentives are
low powered (b low) or when the manager places greater weight on the earnings of the connected
worker (σ high). Finally, when the complementarity is weak and either incentives are strong or
the social weight is small, the manager targets the high ability worker, and social connections do
not aﬀect the firm’s productivity.

3.5

Implications

The theoretical framework highlights that the eﬀect of social connections on the productivity of
connected workers is non-negative. It is positive when the manager targets all her eﬀort to the
connected worker. Other things equal, this is more likely to occur when — (i) the eﬀect of social
connections on the complementarity between manager and worker eﬀort is strong; (ii) managerial
incentives are low powered; (iii) the other worker is not connected.
The theoretical framework also highlights that the existence of social connections can be beneficial or detrimental for the firm’s overall productivity, depending on the strength of managerial
incentives, and the strength of the complementarity between managerial eﬀort and the eﬀort of
the connected worker. When the complementarity eﬀect is strong, social connections increase average productivity regardless of the incentive scheme in place. When the complementarity eﬀect is
weak and the manager is connected to the low ability worker, social connections decrease average
productivity if managerial incentives are low powered. Social connections can thus be detrimental
14

for the firm’s productivity if their existence distorts the allocation of managerial eﬀort in favor of
low ability but socially connected workers.
In what follows, we empirically analyze the eﬀect of social connections on the productivity of
individual workers both when their managers are paid fixed wages and when their pay depends
on the average productivity of workers. As illustrated above, this comparison also allows us to
establish the eﬀect of social connections on overall firm performance as a function of the managerial
incentive scheme in place.

4
4.1

Data, Descriptives, and Empirical Method
Data Sources

The firm’s personnel records are our main data source. These records contain three types of information. First, they list each worker’s productivity on every field-day they pick fruit. Productivity
is defined as the kilograms of fruit picked per hour, and is electronically recorded with little measurement error. Second, they allow us to identify all the workers and managers present on each
field-day. Finally, they contain information on each individual’s nationality, date of arrival, and
accommodation location on the farm.
Throughout, we analyze data on the main fruit type on the farm, focus on the main farm
site during the peak picking season from May 1st until August 31st, and restrict the sample to
fields that were picked at least one week either side of the change in managerial incentives.19 The
sample contains 14439 worker-field-day productivity observations from 241 field-days. This covers
393 workers, 10 managers, 13 fields, and 94 days. As part of our experimental design, the change
in managerial incentives occurred midway through the peak season — June 27th — so there are 43
days in the pre-bonus period and 51 days post-bonus.

4.2

Measuring Social Connections

We measure social connections between managers and workers along three dimensions — nationality,
time of arrival on the farm, and the location on the farm where individuals reside during the season.
The first measure defines a worker and manager to be connected if they are of the same
nationality, based on the assumption that people are more likely to befriend others who come
from the same country and share the same mother tongue. Given that individuals are hired
seasonally from eight Eastern European countries, we observe considerable variation along this
19

Fields are located on two sites on the farm, of which we only use the largest for the analysis as fruit in the
smaller site began to ripen only after the introduction of the managerial performance bonus scheme.
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dimension.20
The second measure of social connections is based on the time that individuals arrive on the
farm. This varies across individuals for reasons that are exogenous to the worker’s performance
on the farm, such as their university term dates in their home countries and the date on which
their work permit is issued. On arrival, individuals are consecutively assigned a worker number
and then attend an induction programme with others that have arrived at a similar time. Hence
the first group of people that a given individual is exposed to, and may form social ties with, are
those that arrive on a similar date. If two individuals have a worker number within the same ten
digit window, we define the two to be socially connected through their arrival cohort.
The third measure of social connections is based on the geographic location where individuals
live during their stay on the farm. Each worker lives in a caravan with up to five others, and
each caravan is assigned a unique number. On the main farm site caravans are arranged around a
communal space and numbered consecutively from 1 to 46. We define two individuals to be socially
connected through their living site if they live within five caravan numbers of each other.21 The
underlying assumption is that individuals are more likely to form social ties with their neighbors.
The advantage of using these three exogenous predictors of friendship rather than any direct
measure of friendship ties is that the latter are likely to be endogenously determined by manager
and worker behavior in the workplace, and also likely to capture the eﬀect of unobservables that
determine both the formation of friendship and worker productivity.
Most workers in our sample are connected to at least one of the ten managers. Of the 14439
worker-field-day observations in our sample, 12287 correspond to workers that are socially connected to managers along some dimension. Two points should be noted. First, on observables such
as age, gender, and previous work experience, unconnected workers are not significantly diﬀerent
to connected workers. Second, to identify the causal eﬀect of social connections on worker performance we exploit the within worker variation across field-days, in social connections between him
and his managers. Those workers that are not connected to any of the managers do not therefore
contribute to the estimated parameters of interest. Hence for the main analysis we focus attention
on those workers that are socially connected to at least one manager on the farm.
We combine the information on social connectivity along these three dimensions as follows.
We define cij = 1 if worker i and manager j are connected along any dimension, and 0 otherwise.
If there are Mf t managers present on the field-day, the share of managers the worker is connected
to on the field-day is,
P
j cij
,
(5)
Cif t =
Mf t
20

Among workers, the most common nationality are the Polish (35%), followed by Ukrainians (29%) and Bulgarians (10%). Among managers, 40% are Polish, 30% are Bulgarian, and the others are Lithuanian.
21
There are no opportunities for workers to themselves choose their caravan or worker numbers.
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where the summation in the numerator is over all managers j on field-day f t.
On most field-days there are between 2 and 4 managers and between 40 and 80 workers
present.22 While each worker is assigned to only one manager, we do not know the exact matching
of workers to managers within the field. We thus interpret (5) as the probability that worker i is
connected to his manager on field-day f t.
This measure of connectivity varies within a worker over field-days as the identity of his managers over field-days changes. To compare field-days in which worker i is surely not connected to
his manager, to field-days in which he is connected with positive probability, we define the dummy
variable DCif t , which equals one if Cif t > 0, and is zero otherwise. This measures whether a worker
is connected, in any way, to any of his managers on the field-day. Finally, to assess whether the
k
three dimensions of connectivity are equally relevant we define measures of connectivity Cif
t along
each dimension k, between worker i and managers on the field-day. We use these alternative
k
measures of social connections — Cif t , DCif t , and Cif
t — at various stages of the analysis.

4.3

Descriptives

Table 1 reports descriptive statistics for our variable of interest Cif t , the share of managers worker i
is connected to on field-day f t. The first row shows that, on average, a worker is socially connected
to .433 managers on a given field-day when managers are paid fixed wages. The share is almost
identical (.439) when managers are paid performance bonuses, suggesting that the process by
which managers and workers are allocated to fields does not change over the two halves of the
season.
The empirical analysis exploits the variation in social connections within a worker over time.
Table 1 shows the extent of this variation by decomposing the overall variation in social connections
into that arising within and between workers.23 Reassuringly, at least one third of the overall
variation in social connections arises from variation within a worker over field-days, and this is
true under both managerial incentive schemes.
The remainder of the table shows the descriptives of social connections along each dimension,
k
Cif
t . On average, a worker is socially connected to 31% of the managers by nationality, to 12% by
22

The median number of managers and workers is 3 and 59, respectively. Field-days with less than 4 managers
account for 83% of the sample.
23
For the variance decomposition to sum to the total variance in an unbalanced panel, it is necessary to weight
the between component by the number of workers on the field-day, denoted If t . If N denotes the number of
observations in the sample and F T denotes the number of field-days, the decomposition of the total variance of
social connections Cif t , into the within and between components, as reported in Table 2, is,
ft ¡
ft ¡
T IP
T IP
T
¢
¢
¢
¡
1 FP
1 FP
1 FP
If t C f t − C .
Cif t − C =
Cif t − C f t +
N f t=1i=1
N f t=1i=1
N f t=1
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living site and to 5% by arrival cohort. Along each dimension, there is notable variation in social
connections within each worker over field-days.
Throughout we analyze the eﬀect of social connections on worker productivity because, in our
setting, this can be directly aﬀected by managers’ behavior and because workers’ productivity is
tied to their earnings given that workers are paid piece rates. Table 2 provides information on
how workers’ productivity varies by their social connectivity to their manager on the field-day as
measured by the dummy variable DCif t , and the managerial compensation scheme in place. The
first column shows that on average, worker productivity is 6.95kg/hr when workers are managed
by individuals they are unconnected to, and their managers are paid a fixed wage. Under the
same managerial incentive scheme, the productivity of the same workers significantly rises by
1.31kg/hr to 8.27kg/hr when they are managed by individuals they are socially connected to.
From a baseline average productivity of 7.93kg/hr across all worker observations when managers
are paid a fixed wage, this diﬀerence corresponds to a 17% increase in the productivity of the
same worker when managed by individuals he is socially connected to, relative to himself when
managed by individuals he is not socially connected to.
The second column presents evidence on the same comparison when managers are paid a
performance bonus. We find that, on average, the productivity of a worker is no diﬀerent on fielddays when he is socially connected to his managers to field-days when he is socially unconnected
to his managers. The unconditional diﬀerence-in-diﬀerence in workers’ productivity by their social
connections to managers and across managerial incentive scheme, is 1.20kg/hr, and is significantly
diﬀerent from zero.24
Three points are of note. First, diﬀerences in worker productivity by social connectivity to
managers and managerial incentive scheme translate into similar diﬀerences in worker earnings.
More precisely, when managers are paid a fixed wage, workers earn, on average, £2.02 more on
a field-day when they are managed by individuals they are socially connected to, compared to
themselves when they are managed by individuals they are socially unconnected to. Relative
to a base pay per field-day of £12.8, this corresponds to a 16% increase in earnings. This is
quantitatively important both in percentage terms and in absolute terms when aggregated over
the season.25 When managers are paid performance bonuses, workers’ earnings are not significantly
diﬀerent whether they are socially connected to their managers or not. The diﬀerence-in-diﬀerence
24

The standard errors in Table 2 are calculated from running the OLS regression that corresponds to each of
the unconditional diﬀerences. We account for the fact that there are multiple observations from each worker by
allowing the error terms to be clustered at the worker level.
25
The average worker picks on two to three fields per day and stays on the farm for 100 days. A back of the
envelope calculation suggests that over the course of a season, a worker would earn £500 more if managers were
always paid a fixed wage, and they were always managed by individuals they are socially connected to. Given that
workers in our sample live in Eastern Europe and much of their earnings are saved to spend in their home country,
the real value of these diﬀerences is therefore substantial.
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in earnings is £2.08 per field-day, and is significantly diﬀerent from zero.
Second, as this eﬀect of social connections only exists when managers are paid fixed wages suggests that such favoritism may be detrimental to the firm’s overall performance. If not, then when
managers are paid performance bonuses that tie their compensation to the average productivity
of workers managed, we would expect the extent of favoritism to increase further if such behavior
also raised average productivity.
Third, when managers are paid a performance bonus, the productivity of workers when they
are socially unconnected rises to the levels when they are socially connected. Hence the diﬀerencein-diﬀerence is positive because with the change in managerial compensation scheme, worker productivity when socially unconnected catches up with worker productivity when socially connected.
Reading across the columns, we note there is a significant increase in productivity moving
from a regime in which managers are paid a fixed wage, to when they are paid performance
bonuses. This increase corresponds to the eﬀect of the introduction of managerial performance
pay, and has been analyzed in detail in earlier work (Bandiera et al 2005b). In this paper we
focus on understanding the eﬀects of social connections between a worker and his manager, on
worker performance. Our identification strategy relies on a within worker comparison under both
managerial incentive schemes. Hence the eﬀects of the change in managerial incentives that are
common to all workers do not confound the identification of main parameters of interest. We later
spell out in more detail the precise assumptions underlying our identification strategy, and in the
Appendix we present evidence in favor of these assumptions.
To understand whether there are heterogeneous eﬀects across workers underlying the average
diﬀerences reported in Table 2, Figure 2 shows graphically how each worker’s productivity varies,
by social connections to his managers, under each managerial incentive scheme. Figure 2a shows
that when managers are paid a fixed wage, in general, a worker has higher average productivity on
field-days when managed by individuals he is socially connected to, relative to himself on field-days
when managed by individuals he is socially unconnected to. Namely, the bulk of workers lie well
above the 45◦ line. In contrast, Figure 2b shows that when managers are paid a performance bonus,
the average productivities of workers are not systematically higher or lower on field-days when
they are socially connected to their managers relative to field-days when they are not. Namely,
worker productivities are equally dispersed around the 45◦ line.
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4.4

Empirical Method

To identify whether social connections aﬀect worker’s productivity, and how this depends on the
managerial compensation scheme in place, we estimate the following panel data regression,
¢ P
P P k¡
k
τ d Bt × Did
μs Ssf t +δXif t +ηZf t +uif t ,
yif t = αi +λf +γ 0 (1 − Bt )×Cif t +γ 1 (Bt × Cif t )+ρBt +
+
k d∈Nk

s∈Mf t

(6)
where yif t is worker i’s productivity on field f and day t. The worker fixed eﬀects αi account
for permanent diﬀerences across workers in their productivity, such as those arising from innate
ability or motivation, and the field fixed eﬀects λf capture permanent diﬀerences in the level of
productivity across fields, such as soil quality.26
Cif t is the share of managers worker i is socially connected to on the field-day, as defined in
(5). Bt is a dummy variable equal to one after the performance bonus is introduced (June 27th),
and zero otherwise. Hence (1 − Bt ) × Cif t measures social connections when managers are paid
a fixed wage, and (Bt × Cif t ) measures social connections when managers are paid a performance
bonus. By also including the bonus dummy variable Bt itself, we capture any eﬀect of the change
of managerial incentives that is common to all workers.
The coeﬃcients of interest throughout are γ 0 and γ 1 . The null hypothesis is that connections
do not aﬀect productivity, so γ 0 = γ 1 = 0. As highlighted by theory, there are a number of
plausible alternative hypotheses. If for example the use of social connections reduces average
productivity then this type of behavior should be mitigated under performance bonuses so that
γ 0 > γ 1 ≥ 0. Alternatively, if the use of social connections increases average productivity then
this type of behavior should be exacerbated under performance bonuses so that γ 1 > γ 0 ≥ 0.
The inclusion of the worker fixed eﬀects αi allows us to address the concern that unobservable
time invariant worker characteristics drive both social connections to managers and worker performance. The eﬀect of social connections γ 0 and γ 1 are thus identified from variation in the level
of social connections to managers, within the same worker over diﬀerent field-days.
However, since connectivity is defined along nationality, living site, and arrival cohort, γ 0 and
γ 1 might be biased if, for example, the introduction of the bonus has diﬀerent eﬀects on workers of
diﬀerent nationalities. This is because the connection measure Cif t would then also be picking up
any diﬀerential eﬀect of the performance bonus by worker nationality. Obviously, similar concerns
arise if workers are diﬀerentially aﬀected on the basis of their living site or time of arrival on the
farm once managerial performance bonuses are introduced.
To address these concerns we control for a set of interactions between the performance bonus
26

If this specification is estimated only with worker fixed eﬀects, they explain 25% of the variation in worker
productivity, suggesting there is considerable heterogeneity across workers. Estimating the specification only conditional on field fixed eﬀects explains 11% of the overall variation.

20

dummy Bt and the complete set of nationality, arrival cohort and living site dummies. We define
k
= 1 if worker i is of type-d along dimension k, and 0 otherwise, and
the dummy variable Did
Nk denotes the total number of types along dimension k. For example, when k is nationality,
k
= 1 when the worker is of nationality d and Nk is equal to eight as this is the number of
Did
diﬀerent nationalities in our data. These interactions flexibly control for any heterogenous eﬀect
on workers of the change in managerial incentives along these dimensions. Hence we estimate the
eﬀect of the within worker variation in social connectivity conditional on any heterogeneous eﬀects
between workers that may arise as managers respond to the introduction of performance bonuses
along other margins apart from those arising from social connections with their subordinates.
Ssf t is a dummy equal to one if manager s works on field f on day t, and zero otherwise,
P
μs Ssf t in (6) corresponds
and Mf t is the set of managers that work on the field-day. Hence
s∈Mf t

to a full set of manager dummies. These control for time invariant traits of each manager, such
as their ability to motivate workers and their management style, that aﬀect the performance of
managed workers. These allow us to address the concern that there are unobservable managers’
characteristics that drive both their social connections and the performance of their subordinates.
Xif t captures worker i’s time varying characteristics. This includes the worker’s picking experience, defined as the cumulative number of field-days they have picked fruit on the farm. Zf t
captures time-varying field characteristics. This includes the field’s life cycle, defined as the nth
day the field is picked divided by the total number of days the field is picked over the season. This
captures the natural within-field trend in productivity as fields deplete over time. We also include
a time trend to capture learning by farm management and any aggregate trends in productivity.27
Finally, we note that the social connections between a worker and his managers are unlikely to
be identically and independently distributed within a worker over field-days. We therefore adopt
a conservative strategy in estimating standard errors and allow the disturbance terms uif t to be
clustered by worker throughout.28

4.5

Identifying Assumptions

We identify the eﬀect of social connections on worker productivity by exploiting the within worker
variation in social connections to his manager over field-days, and by exploiting the experimental
variation in managerial incentives, as discussed in Section 2. There are two underlying identifying
assumptions related to these two sources of variation.
27

As fields are operated on at diﬀerent parts of the season, and not all workers pick each day, the eﬀects of the
field life cycle and workers’ picking experience can be separately identified from that of the time trend. The average
field life cycle is not significantly diﬀerent under the two managerial compensation schemes.
28
Clustering the disturbance terms uif t by field-day — say because workers on the same field-day face common
productivity shocks — leads to the standard errors on the parameters of interest, γ 0 and γ 1 , being considerably
smaller than those we report.
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The first is that unobservable determinants of workers’ allocation to managers are orthogonal to
the managerial incentive scheme in place. As discussed in Section 2.2, the within worker variation
in social connections is exogenous to the behavior of workers and managers because the allocation
of individuals to fields is determined by the COO, based on the demand for labor for picking and
non-picking tasks across fields. Nevertheless workers’ allocation to managers might still depend
on factors that aﬀect performance and are observable to the COO but not the econometrician.
To provide support for this assumption, Tables A1 and A2 present evidence that the allocation
rules do not change with the change in managerial incentives. First we compare the allocation of
the connected workers we use for our analysis, to the allocation of unconnected workers. Table A1
estimates conditional logit regressions of the probability that, conditional on working, worker i is
selected to pick fruit on day t, versus being selected for non-picking tasks. We also estimate the
probability of, conditional on not picking, worker i being chosen for non-picking tasks versus being
left unemployed on day t. Reassuringly, we find that when performance bonuses are introduced,
neither probability changes diﬀerentially for socially connected and unconnected workers.
Second, we show that field-day and worker-field-day specific determinants of productivity do
not predict the level of social connections Cif t diﬀerently under the two managerial incentive
schemes. More precisely, in Table A2 we estimate regressions of the form,
Cif t = αi + λf + υBt + [(φ0 + φ1 Bt ) × Xif t ] + [(ϕ0 + ϕ1 Bt ) × Zf t ] +

P

μs Ssf t + uif t ,

(7)

s∈Mf t

where Bt is the bonus dummy, Xif t captures worker i’s time varying characteristics and Zf t
captures several time-varying field characteristics. Our identifying assumption requires φ1 = ϕ1 =
0. Table A2 reports the p-values of the t-tests on each interaction variable and on the joint F-test
of their significance. Reassuringly, we fail to reject the null of zero coeﬃcients in all cases.29
The second identifying assumption is that any eﬀect of social connections on individual productivity unrelated to the managerial incentive scheme in place, remains unchanged over time. We
later address this concern by allowing the eﬀects of social connections to vary over time. In particular we estimate whether the eﬀects of social connections vary — (i) across the first and second
halves within each managerial incentive scheme (eﬀectively dividing the season up into quarters);
(ii) with the field’s life cycle; (iii) with the time the worker has been present on the farm. In each
29

Three other pieces of evidence also suggest that farm operations do not change over the two halves of the
season. First, the ratio of workers to managers does not change significantly over the two halves of the season and
remains at 20 throughout. Second, at the field-day level, the average share of workers that are socially connected
to managers does not change significantly over the two halves of the season, nor does the variation in this share
between fields on the same day. This suggests workers do not become sorted into fields by social connections over
time. Third, using the estimated worker fixed eﬀect from (6), α
b i , as a measure of a worker’s ability, we find that
groups of workers on the field-day are equally heterogeneous before and after the change in managerial incentives.
Hence there is no evidence the COO sorts workers diﬀerently by ability into fields post-bonus.
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case we find no evidence that the eﬀects of social connections on individual productivity change
over time with these three factors. Rather there is a discontinuous eﬀect of social connections on
worker performance that occurs precisely at the time when managerial incentives are exogenously
altered as part of the experimental research design.

5
5.1

Empirical Analysis
Baseline Results

Table 3 presents estimates of our baseline specification (6). In Column 1 we measure social
connections with the dummy variable DCif t which identifies whether a worker is connected, in
any way, to any of his managers on the field-day. This is the variable used for the unconditional
diﬀerence-in-diﬀerence in Table 2. The results show that the pattern of unconditional diﬀerences
in worker productivity by social connections and managerial incentive scheme reported in Table
2, are robust to conditioning on a rich set of determinants of worker productivity. The result in
Column 1 shows that when managers are paid a fixed wage, the average worker has significantly
higher productivity on field-days on which he is socially connected to his managers (b
γ 0 > 0). When
managers are paid performance bonuses, there is no eﬀect on the average worker’s productivity of
being more socially connected to her managers on the field-day (b
γ 1 = 0).
The magnitude of the γ
b0 coeﬃcient implies that when managers are paid a fixed wage, being
connected to at least one manager on the field, increases productivity by 4% for the average worker,
whereas there is no such eﬀect when managers are paid performance bonuses. As suggested by
the descriptive evidence in Table 2, this result is not driven by a lack of within worker variation
in social connections to managers under the two managerial incentive schemes.
In Column 2 we use Cif t — the share of managers the worker is connected to by nationality,
living site, or arrival cohort — as our measure of social connections. Compared to the dummy
variable DCif t , this is a more precise measure as it distinguishes between field-days in which a
worker is connected to potentially more than one manager. The pattern of coeﬃcients is the
same as in Column 1 but the implied magnitude of the eﬀect is much larger. Evaluating at the
mean, the magnitude of b
γ 0 implies that when managers are paid a fixed wage, the productivity
of a worker on field-days when he is socially connected to all the managers on the field relative
to his productivity on field-days when he is socially unconnected to managers, will be .752 kg/hr
higher, other things equal. Relative to a baseline average worker productivity of 7.93kg/hr when
managers are paid fixed wages, this represents a 9.5% increase in the productivity of connected
workers.30
30
While these baseline results focus on the eﬀects of social connections on worker productivity, we also explored
whether the strength of social ties between a worker and his managers aﬀect worker productivity. We can define
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The diﬀerence between the estimated b
γ 0 parameters in Columns 1 and 2 lends support to
the idea that managers and workers do not choose who they work with, even within a field-day.
Namely, if managers favor socially connected workers and workers could sort across managers
within the field, workers should assign themselves to a manager they are socially connected to, if
such a manager is present. In that case, however, the eﬀect of being connected to one manager
should be no diﬀerent than being connected to two or more. The fact that the implied eﬀect of
being connected to all managers (from Column 2) is almost twice as big as the eﬀect of being
connected to at least one (from Column 1), indicates that workers cannot assign themselves to a
manager whom they are connected to.
Taken together, this pattern of results suggests the eﬀect of social connections in the workplace
is for managers to favor workers they are connected to when their incentives are low powered. At
γ 1 ). In
the foot of Columns 1 and 2 we report the implied diﬀerence-in-diﬀerence estimate, (b
γ0 − b
line with the descriptive evidence, this is positive in both cases and significantly diﬀerent from
zero at the 1% significance level when using the continuous measure of social connections. This
suggests that the use of social connections does not maximize the firm’s overall performance as
measured by average worker productivity because when managers interests become more aligned
with those of the firm, the eﬀects of social connections are significantly reduced.31
The pattern of coeﬃcients helps rule out three alternative hypotheses of why social connections
may matter in this workplace. First, suppose that workers were always assigned to socially connected managers when productivity on the field is exogenously higher. In this case social connecb1 > 0.32
tions should have the same positive and significant eﬀect under both schemes, i.e. γ
b0 = γ
Second, suppose that when workers are on the field-day with managers they are socially connected to, the marginal utility of leisure is higher because they prefer to socialize with their
managers. If so, however, this should be true under both managerial incentive schemes, i.e.
b1 < 0.
γ
b0 = γ
Third, the pattern of coeﬃcients allows us to rule out the hypothesis that the eﬀect of social
X
k
the strength of the social tie as the number of dimensions along which the two are connected,
DCif
t . We find
k
that a worker’s productivity is monotonically increasing in the number of dimensions along which he is connected
to his managers when his managers are paid a fixed wage, and there is no such eﬀect under performance bonuses.
However, these results should be interpreted with caution because, given that each dimension of connectivity is
orthogonal to the others, there are only 5% of observations from which the eﬀects of being connected along strictly
more than one dimension can be identified.
31
We also addressed the concern that social connections of workers are correlated within the same field-date by
clustering standard errors at the connection level within each field-date. The baseline results are robust to this
alternative clustering.
32
A related concern is that the share of managers a worker is connected to is higher on field-days when there
are more managers present. If more managers are present when productivity is expected to be higher this would
lead to a spurious correlation between social connections and worker productivity. As a check for this, we find no
correlation between the share of managers a worker is connected to and the number of managers on the field-day.
This correlation is -.02 when managers are paid fixed wages and .01 when they are paid performance bonuses.
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connections is driven by workers’ rather than managers’ behavior. Indeed, if workers were to
internalize the eﬀect of their eﬀort on their manager’s pay when socially connected to her, we
would observe workers exerting more eﬀort when this actually aﬀects the manager’s pay, namely
b1 .
when the manager is paid the performance bonus, i.e. b
γ0 = 0 < γ
One concern is that the COO intentionally sorts managers and workers into fields on their basis
of their social connections. If so, the eﬀect of social connections would be biased downwards. To
check for this, we exploit the fact that some dimensions of connectivity, such as nationality, are
more easily observable to the COO than others, such as time of arrival. If such sorting biases the
estimates, we should find the eﬀect of social connections to be mostly driven by dimensions that
are easier to observe. Column 3 then estimates a specification analogous to (6) that separately
k
controls for each dimension of social connectivity, Cif
t . We see that when managers are paid a
fixed wage, social connections along each of the dimensions have a positive and significant eﬀect
on worker productivity.
To compare the magnitudes of the b
γ k0 coeﬃcients, we consider the implied eﬀect on worker
k
33
We find that when
productivity of a one standard deviation increase in Cif
t from its mean.
managers are paid a fixed wage, the productivity of a given worker is 4.7%, 1.6% and 2.5% higher
when the share of managers he is connected to by nationality, living site, and arrival cohort
respectively, is one standard deviation higher. Social connections along any dimension do not
aﬀect worker productivity when managers are paid a performance bonus.34
A second concern is that the diﬀerence-in-diﬀerence estimate of social connections might be
picking up any heterogeneous eﬀects of the managerial bonus scheme across workers. Indeed,
in earlier work (Bandiera et al 2005b) we have shown that managers target their eﬀort towards
more able workers when performance bonuses are introduced, and this explains changes in the
productivity between workers under the two managerial incentive schemes. If worker ability is
correlated to our measure of social connections to managers, the diﬀerence-in-diﬀerence estimate
would be biased.
To take account of this we introduce a complete set of interactions between each worker’s fixed
eﬀect and the performance bonus dummy. This is the most general way to capture diﬀerential
eﬀects across workers of the change in managerial incentives. The result, reported in Column 4,
shows that the magnitude and significance of the parameters of interest are similar to those in the
33

Table 1 shows there are diﬀerences in the mean and standard deviation of each measure of social connectivity.
We chose to measure social connections along the dimensions of nationality, living site and time of arrival in
order to capture social links that form for diﬀerent reasons and, indeed the correlation among the three measures
k
Cif
t is very low. We therefore expect their estimated eﬀect on productivity to be the same, regardless of whether
they are included together or one at the time. Appendix Table A3 controls
for ´the share of managers worker i is
³
k
k
connected to along dimension k (Cif t ) in (6). We find the pattern of the γ
b0 , γ
bk1 coeﬃcients to be similar to those
34

bk1 ), are positive and significantly
reported in Column 3. In addition the implied diﬀerence-in-diﬀerences, (b
γ k0 − γ
diﬀerent from zero at conventional levels in all cases.
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baseline estimates.
The final specification addresses the concern that there may be factors at the field-day level
that create a spurious correlation between social connections and productivity. For example,
managers might lobby the COO to be allocated workers they are connected to on field-days when
productivity is exogenously higher. To address this concern the final specification includes fieldday fixed eﬀects. The eﬀects of social connections Cif t under each managerial incentive scheme
are then identified oﬀ the variation across workers in the same field-day in the level of their
social connections in deviation from the workers’ average level of social connections under each
managerial compensation scheme. The result in Column 5 shows the previous results to be robust
to conditioning on factors that vary across field-days, such as managers lobbying for workers, field
conditions, the hours worked on the field-day, or the level of the piece rate for workers.
Finally, we perform a falsification exercise based on measures of social connectivity that are
purely spurious. These are based on whether the worker and manager have the same — (i) initial
on their first name (A-Z); (ii) day of month of birth (1-31); (iii) day of week of birth (MondaySunday). The results of this falsification exercise are presented in Table A4. Reassuringly, we
find that these spurious measures of social connection have no eﬀect on worker productivity under
either managerial incentive scheme.35

5.2
5.2.1

Econometric Concerns
Time Varying Factors

The first set of econometric concerns relates to the assumption that any eﬀect of social connections on individual productivity unrelated to the managerial incentive scheme in place, remains
b1 may simply pick up that the eﬀect of social conunchanged over time. If not, then γ
b0 and γ
nections naturally dies out over time, rather than because managers change their behavior when
they are paid performance bonuses. For example, managers may initially favor some workers in
order to befriend them. Similarly workers may initially work hard under some managers in order
to befriend them. This would explain the pattern of coeﬃcients we find in the data and suggests
that favoritism is not a long run equilibrium phenomenon.
In Table 4 we analyze whether the eﬀects of social connections on worker productivity naturally
disappear over time. In Column 1 we split both the pre and post performance bonus periods into
halves and allow the eﬀect of connections to change within the pre and post bonus periods.
Intuitively, if the eﬀect of social connections were naturally declining over time we would expect it
to be higher in the first half of the pre-bonus period than in the second half, and again, higher in
35

We defined these spurious measures of social connections along these three dimensions in particular because
their mean value, and variation between and within workers, by managerial incentive scheme, are similar to those
for the living site and arrival cohort based measures actually used in the analysis.
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the first half of the post-bonus period than in the second half. Column 1 shows that, in contrast,
there is no change in the eﬀect of social connections within each period. Rather the eﬀect of
social connections on worker productivity disappears discontinuously with the introduction of the
performance bonus for managers.
γ 1 might pick up that later in the field life cycle there is less
A second concern is that γ
b0 and b
variation in the fruit available across diﬀerent rows, and so managers have no means by which to
favor connected workers, even though they prefer to do so. To check for this, in Column 2 we
allow the eﬀect of social connections to vary with a field specific time trend — the field life cycle.
We find no evidence that the eﬀect of social connections diminishes within a field over time.
A third time related concern is that the true social ties between a worker and his managers are
measured with error using Cif t which is based on three particular dimensions. This measurement
error is non-classical because it increases over time if workers learn they are better oﬀ being
socially connected to managers, and so invest more into forming social ties with managers over
time, irrespective of whether they are of the same nationality, living site, and arrival cohort. If
so, we should find the eﬀect of Cif t to diminish with the time the worker has spent on the farm.
In Column 3 we allow the eﬀect of social connections to vary with a worker specific time trend —
the number of days the worker has been present on the farm. There is no evidence the eﬀect of
social connections diminishes as a worker spends more time on the farm.
Finally in Column 4 we present a placebo test using fields that were picked on only after the
introduction of the performance bonus and are therefore excluded from our main sample. Given
that in our sample the bonus is introduced when the average (and median) field is half the way
through its life cycle, we define a placebo bonus dummy to be equal to zero if the field is in the first
half of its life cycle and equal to one if it is in the second half. The results in Column 4 indicate
that social connections have no eﬀect on worker productivity either side of the placebo dummy,
thus ruling out that our previous results were due to the eﬀect of social connections naturally
disappearing once fields have reached half of their life cycle.
Overall, the evidence in Table 4 indicates that the eﬀect of social connections does not decline
smoothly with time, field specific trends, or worker specific trends. Rather there is a discontinuous
eﬀect of social connections on worker performance at the time when performance bonuses were
introduced. Given that we had full control over the timing of this change, our experimental
research design ensures that the exact date on which the managerial incentive schemes changed is
uncorrelated with any determinants of individual productivity.
5.2.2

Sample Selection

A second set of econometric concerns relate to the composition of workers in the sample and how
this may diﬀer under the two halves of the season. Consider first the issue that the group of
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workers available to pick fruit is changing over time because workers arrive and leave the farm on
diﬀerent dates. If workers that arrive early in the season when managers are paid a fixed wage
then leave in the second half of the season, a diﬀerent group of workers is used to estimate the
within worker estimates γ 0 and γ 1 .
Some of the reasons why workers arrive and leave at diﬀerent times — such as diﬀerences in
university term dates and the date on which their work permit is issued — are orthogonal to
their performance. However there remain concerns that workers who arrive early in the season
are diﬀerent to those that arrive later. For example, they may be able to form stronger social
ties with managers because there are fewer other workers present earlier in the season. If so our
measure of social connections Cif t is measured with error in the second half of the season, leading
to attenuation bias in b
γ1.
To address this concern Column 1 of Table 5 restricts the sample to workers that are present
and available to pick fruit for three weeks either side of the change in managerial incentives.
When the same group of workers are then used to identify γ 0 and γ 1 , we find the significance
and magnitude of these estimates to be similar to those in the baseline specification. The pattern
of results also remains unchanged in Column 2 where we restrict the sample to workers that are
observed picking under both managerial incentive schemes.
A second issue is that conditional on being present on the farm, the group of workers selected to
pick fruit changes over the two halves of the season. In Bandiera et al (2005b) we show that with
the introduction of the performance bonus scheme, worker productivity rises so that fewer workers
are required to pick the same overall quantity of fruit. We find that workers of higher ability are
then more likely to be selected to pick fruit in the first place. This is of concern if for example,
low ability workers work harder in order to befriend managers they have similar characteristics to
on the field-day, and these workers pick predominantly in the first half of the season. This would
cause γ
b0 to be biased upwards. To address this concern Column 3 of Table 5 restricts the sample
to those workers that are chosen to pick for at least six days under both managerial incentive
schemes. We find the significance and magnitude of the parameters of interest to be similar to
those in the baseline specification.

5.3

Social Connections and the Firm’s Overall Performance

The finding that being socially connected to managers increases the productivity of the average
worker when managers are paid fixed wages whereas social connections do not aﬀect productivity
when managers are paid performance bonuses indicates that in our context, favoring connected
workers does not maximize the firm’s average productivity. As managers stop favoring connected
workers once their pay depends on average productivity, this indicates that favoring connected
workers could have not been maximizing the firm’s average productivity in the first place.
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Since we do not observe managers working only with unconnected workers, we cannot quantify
the eﬀect of social connections and whether the existence of social connections is detrimental to
the firm’s productivity when managers are paid fixed wages. However, the theoretical framework
makes clear that social connections can reduce average productivity when — (i) the eﬀect of social
connections on the complementarity between manager and worker eﬀort is weak (ki is close to one
when σ i = σ); (ii) the manager is connected to some but not all the workers; and, (iii) favors are
rival, namely if the manager devotes time to help one worker he has less time to devote to the
others. In what follows we present evidence on whether these conditions hold in our setting.
First, we expect social connections to strengthen the complementarity between manager and
worker eﬀort because they can reduce informational asymmetries, facilitate joint problem solving,
and provide managers the ability to motivate workers through social rewards and punishments.
In our context, however, the tasks workers are undertaking are relatively simple so any potential
benefits that social connections have for problem solving or improved communication more generally, are likely to be small. In addition, workers face high powered monetary incentives, so that
the scope for the manager to exploit social connections to provide further incentives through social
punishments or rewards is rather limited.
Second, the distribution of social connections among workers in our sample is such that condition (ii) is verified on all field-days. On average, 60% of workers on the field-day are connected to
at least one manager on a given field-day. In addition, the mean and variance of the share of workers connected to managers on the field-day do not diﬀer significantly under the two managerial
incentive schemes.
Third we seek to establish whether managerial eﬀort is a rival good in the sense that if the
manager decides to target her eﬀort towards one worker, she necessarily does so at the expense
of another worker. More precisely, if favors are rival, the eﬀect of social connections on the
productivity of worker i should be smaller when the share of his co-workers who are also connected
to managers, increases. In short, if few workers are connected, the manager can devote all of her
time to favor them. If more workers are connected, the manager needs to spread her favors more
thinly.
To shed light on this we re-estimate our baseline specification (6) and allow the eﬀect of social
connections on the productivity of worker i on field day ft to vary with the share of workers
who are also connected to a manager on field day f t. We first consider social connections and
competition for favors in terms of the dummy variable measure DCif t . Namely, we measure the
competition for favors by the share of workers who are connected to at least one manager on the
X
DCif t where Nf t is the number of workers on
same field-day as worker i. This is given by N1f t
the field-day and the summation is taken over all such workers i.
For ease of comparison, Column 1 of Table 6 replicates the baseline specification of Column 1
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in Table 3. Column 2 then introduces the interaction eﬀect of social connections with this measure
of competition for favors. The result supports the hypothesis that when a greater share of workers
present are socially connected to managers, the eﬀect of connections on the productivity of each
connected worker is smaller. When managers are paid fixed wages, social connections increase
the productivity of a connected worker by 13% if the share of connected workers on the field is
25%, by 8% if the share of connected workers on the field is 50%, by 4% if the share of connected
workers is 75%, and zero if all workers are connected.
Two points are of note. First, as theory suggests, when all workers are connected the manager cannot redistribute eﬀort from unconnected to connected workers, hence the eﬀects of social
connections are zero. Second, the share of workers connected on the field-day does not have a
direct eﬀect on productivity. This further supports the identifying assumption that the allocation
of workers and managers to fields is uncorrelated to the average productivity on the field-day. If
it were, then we would expect worker productivity to be positively correlated with the share of
socially connected workers present on the field-day
In the next two Columns we measure social connections using the continuous measure, Cif t .
We measure competition for favors by the average level of social connections of workers on the
X
Cif t . Column 3 again reports the baseline specification in Column
field-day, as given by N1f t
2 of Table 3 for comparison. In Column 4 we interact the level of social connections with the
measure of competition for favors. We again find that when managers are paid fixed wages, the
eﬀects of social connections are significantly weaker when the average level of social connectivity
of other workers on the field-day is higher. The elasticity of productivity with respect to the
probability of being connected to a manager is .19 when the average co-worker is connected to a
quarter of the managers, .09 when co-workers are connected to half the managers, and zero when
co-workers are connected to three quarters of the managers. Again, we find no evidence of such
heterogenous eﬀects of social connections when managers are paid a performance bonus.
This finding sheds light on the mechanism behind why exploiting social connections across
tiers of the firm hierarchy may be detrimental to overall firm performance. On field-days in which
connected workers are of high ability, social connections reinforce managerial incentives to target
high ability workers. There is therefore no tension between the allocation of managerial eﬀort that
maximizes the manager’s utility and that which maximizes average productivity overall.
On the other hand, on field-days in which connected workers are of low ability and unconnected
workers are of high ability, in order to favor connected workers the manager distorts her eﬀort
away from unconnected workers of higher ability. In this case, the existence of social connections
is detrimental to the firm’s performance.
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6

Discussion

We provide evidence on the interplay between social connections, incentives, and productivity
within a firm. We show that in a setting where managerial eﬀort can be targeted to aﬀect
the productivity and earnings of individual workers, the existence of social connections between
individuals at diﬀerent tiers of the firm hierarchy aﬀects individual and firm performance.
We find that social connections give rise to favoritism, but only when managerial incentives are
low powered. Favoritism increases the productivity of the connected workers but is suboptimal
for the firm’s average productivity.
Our results bring new evidence to the small but growing literature that highlights the importance of social relationships in the workplace. Our findings indicate that managerial behavior is
shaped by both their social connections with their subordinates and their monetary incentives.
Both factors are key to explaining the success of existing incentive structures and to guide the
design of optimal compensation schemes for both workers and managers.
The use of detailed personnel data combined with the purely exogenous variation created by
our natural field experiment allows us to precisely identify the causal eﬀect of social connections
between workers and managers on the performance of individual workers, and on firm performance
overall. Precision, however, inevitably comes at the cost of a loss of generality, because the firm
we study, as any other, has unique features that shape social connections between workers and
managers and their eﬀect on productivity. The following features of this work environment are
particularly noteworthy for the external validity of this study.
First, managers and workers are of similar ages and backgrounds and they live on the farm site
for the entire duration of their stay. Both features increase the likelihood that they form strong
social connections with one another. In other settings, social connections might be less likely to
form or to be strong enough to aﬀect behavior. On the other hand, the workers in this study
are employed on short term seasonal contracts and so long run social ties are less likely to form
relative to other firms.
Second, in our setting managers can help workers by allocating them to better rows, by reallocating them quickly to new rows, and by providing them with new crates as soon as needed. To
the extent that favoritism is disapproved of by unconnected workers, the fact that these actions
are observable by all workers reduce the managers’ ability to favor their friends. Namely we expect the eﬀect of social connections and favoritism to be stronger in settings where favoritism by
managers is more easily disguised.
Third, the specific form that the eﬀects of social connections take, depends on the technology
and incentive schemes in the workplace. In our context workers are paid piece rates and managers
can undertake actions that improve the productivity and hence earnings of connected workers.
In other contexts in which workers are paid fixed wages, social connections might be exploited
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to allow subordinates to slack, allocating subordinates to more desirable positions, or helping
subordinates be promoted. Moreover, in our context workers’ productivity is precisely measured,
so there is also no scope for managers to show favoritism through subjective evaluations of workers.
In general, managers will have more margins along which to favor workers and all such activities
will aﬀect the firm’s overall performance.
Perhaps the most important consideration is that while in our context social connections give
rise to favoritism that is not optimal for the firm’s performance, in other settings social connections might be beneficial. As emphasized throughout, social connections can reduce informational
asymmetries, facilitate joint problem solving, and provide managers the ability to motivate workers through social rewards and punishments. In our context, the tasks workers are undertaking
are relatively simple and so any potential benefits that social connections have for problem solving
or improved communication more generally, are likely to be small. In other settings, the productivity enhancing eﬀects of social connections might dominate the ineﬃciency due to favoritism.
For example Ichniowski and Shaw (2005) present evidence from steel finishing lines — a relatively
complex task that involves problem solving — of such positive eﬀects of improved communication
within and between tiers of the firm hierarchy.36
The fact that managers devote eﬀort to increase the productivity of connected workers, even
when they are paid fixed wages, suggests that social connections between managers and workers can
provide an alternative, and possibly cheaper, mechanism to the provision of monetary incentives.
It may thus be in a firm’s best interests to foster social ties between management and workers.
Indeed many firms are observed devoting resources towards such bonding exercises.37 Relatedly,
the fact that managers behave as if they derive utility from helping connected workers, implies
that being socially connected to their subordinates lowers the managers’ participation constraint
and thus the firm’s wage bill may be reduced. However, this strategy may be suboptimal if it
leads to the self selection of lower quality managers to the firm over time.
More generally, our findings provide support to the idea that interplays between social relationships and incentives need to be taken into account, in order to understand how individuals
respond to a given set of incentives, and to understand the optimal set of incentives within an
organization. Diﬀerences in the social organization of the workplace might therefore explain part
of the productivity diﬀerences among otherwise observationally similar firms.
36

Relatedly, Nagin et al (2002) present evidence from a field experiment in a call centre that exogenously varied the
probability that employees would be monitored by managers. Their results suggest that management’s “perceived
empathy and fairness” in dealing with employees may play an important role in reducing workplace opportunism.
Other beneficial eﬀects of social capital within firms has also been discussed in the sociology literature. These
include potentially better hiring outcomes through the use of referrals by current employees (Fernandez et al 2000).
37
Social connections within firms are just one alternative to using monetary incentives to solve agency problems.
There is a growing theoretical and empirical literature on the relationship between intrinsic and extrinsic motivation
(Frey and Oberholzer-Gee 1997, Kreps 1997, Benabou and Tirole 2003).
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7
7.1

Appendix
Proofs

¢
¡
Proof of Proposition 1: The marginal benefit of targeting worker l is 2b + σ l kl el whereas
¢
¡
the marginal benefit of targeting worker h is 2b + σ h kh eh . If neither worker is connected, the
marginal benefit of targeting worker i is 2b ei and this is larger for worker h since, by Assumption
1, el < eh . If both workers are connected, then the the marginal benefit of targeting worker i is
¢
¡b
+
σ
kei , which again is higher for worker h under Assumption 1. Finally, if the manager is
2
¢
¡
connected only to worker h, the marginal benefit of targeting worker h is 2b + σ keh which is
higher than the marginal benefit of targeting worker l, namely 2b el , both because σ > 0, k > 1 and
el < eh .¥
¡
¢
Proof of Proposition 2: From (4) we see that the manager targets worker l if 2b + σ kel >
¡
¢
b
e , thus targeting worker l is an equilibrium if and only if 2b + σ kel (ml = 1) > 2b eh (ml = 1).
2 h
¢
¡
Similarly, targeting worker h is an equilibrium if and only if 2b + σ kel (ml = 0) < 2b eh (ml = 0).
Taken together the two conditions imply that;
h
− 12 targeting worker l is the unique equilibrium,
(i) if σb > θl /θ
k
θl /θh
h
− 12 < σb < θl /θ
− 12 , both targeting worker l and targeting worker h are equilibria,
(ii) if 2k(1+k)
k
θl /θh
− 12 targeting worker h is the unique equilibrium.
(iii) if σb < 2k(1+k)
¢
¡
h
− 12
Figure 1 depicts the two conditions in σb , k space. The two curves are the σb = θl /θ
k
θl /θh
and σb = 2k(1+k)
− 12 loci. When social connections do not aﬀect the complementarity between
managerial and worker eﬀort, namely when k = 1, the vertical intercept of the former is θθhl − 12 ,
and of the latter 4θθlh − 12 . When the manager does not care about the earnings of the connected
³q
´
worker, namely when σ = 0, the horizontal intercepts of the two loci are 2 θθhl and 12 2 4 θθhl − 1 − 1
respectively.¥
Proof of Proposition 3: We first show that when the manager is connected to the high
ability worker or to both workers, average productivity is higher than when she is connected to
neither worker. When the manager is not connected ³to either´worker, by Proposition 1 she targets
the high ability worker and average productivity is 12 θ1l + θ4h . When the manager is connected to
both, or the high
worker³only, she
³ ability2 ´
´ targets the high ability worker and average productivity
(1+k)
1
1
1
1
4
≥ 2 θl + θh for any k ≥ 1.
is equal to 2 θl + θh
When the manager is connected to the low
worker max³ ability worker,
´
³targeting
´ the low abilityq
1 (1+k)2
1
1
1
4
+ θh > 2 θl + θh , namely, k > 2 3 θθhl + 1−1.
imizes average productivity if and only if 2
θl
q
A suﬃcient condition for the manager to target the low ability worker is k > 2 θθhl > 2 3 θθhl + 1 − 1.
Hence for k > 2 θθhl , social connections are beneficial to the firm’s average productivity regardless
of whether the manager is connected to the high ability worker, the low ability worker, or both.
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q
When the complementarity is weak, namely when k < 2 3 θθhl + 1 − 1, average productivity
is maximized by targeting the high ability worker regardless of whom the manager is connected
to. However, whether the manager targets the high ability worker depends on the strength of her
preferences for the low ability worker σ, and on the strength of managerial incentives b. From the
h
− 12 , targeting the low ability worker is
proof of Proposition 2 above we know that when σb > θl /θ
k
the unique equilibrium. In this case social connections reduce average productivity because they
distort the allocation of managerial eﬀort in favor of the connected worker who is of low ability.
θl /θh
− 12 targeting worker h is the unique equilibrium. In this case,
On the other hand, when σb < 2k(1+k)
the social connection between the manager and worker l has no eﬀect on average productivity.¥

7.2

The COO’s Allocation of Workers to Tasks

We present evidence in support of our identifying assumption that the COO’s allocation of workers
to fields does not change diﬀerentially across the two managerial incentive schemes for socially
connected and unconnected workers. More precisely, we estimate the probability of a given worker
being selected into employment by the COO, while controlling for farm level variables that aﬀect
the probability of being hired independently of the incentive scheme in place. These farm level
variables measure the supply and demand of labor.
We measure labor supply using personnel records on the number of workers available for hire
on the farm on any given day. We measure the demand for labor using the total daily fruit yield on
each site on the farm. The total yield is orthogonal to the incentive scheme as it is determined by
planting decisions taken one or two years earlier. Fields are located on two sites, of which we use
the largest for the analysis as fruit in the smaller site begins to ripen only after the introduction
of the performance bonus scheme. Since both sites hire workers from the same pool, we control
for yields in each site separately.
We then estimate the following conditional logit model, where observations are grouped by
worker,
(8)
Pr(pit = 1) = Λ(Bt , Bt × Ci , XtD , XtS , Xit ).
pit = 1 if worker i is selected by the COO to pick on day t on the main site, and 0 if they are
assigned to non-picking tasks. Bt is the performance bonus dummy, Ci is a dummy variable equal
to one if worker i is socially connected to any of the managers along any dimension of nationality,
arrival cohort, and living site, and is zero otherwise. XtD and XtS proxy the demand and supply
of labor on day t. To allow for a workers’ previous performance to aﬀect their probability of
being selected, Xit measures worker i’s productivity on the last day she picked, in percentage
deviation from the mean productivity on that day, to remove the eﬀects of factors that determine
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the productivity of all workers and are beyond the worker’s control.38
All continuous variables are divided by their standard deviations so that one unit increase can
be interpreted as an increase of one standard deviation. We report odds ratios throughout, and
standard errors are calculated using the delta method.
Column 1 of Table A1 shows that, other things equal, there is no diﬀerential eﬀect on socially
connected or unconnected workers of being selected to pick fruit after the introduction of the
performance bonus. The other coeﬃcients show that, as expected, workers are more likely to be
assigned to fruit picking tasks on days in which the fields on the main site bears more fruit and
on days in which they face less competition from other workers.
Conditional on not being selected to pick on the main site on a given day, a worker can either
be assigned to other tasks on the main site, to work on the other site, or be left unemployed for
the day. The next specification checks whether the assignment of workers to non picking tasks
varies diﬀerentially by socially connected and unconnected workers, when the performance bonus
is introduced. The result in Column 2 again shows there to be no such diﬀerential eﬀect of the
COO’s decision across workers based on their social connection to managers. The pattern of other
coeﬃcients confirms that the introduction of the bonus scheme significantly raises the probability
of being unemployed. As expected, the probability of being unemployed for the day is lower when
yields are higher and when the stock of available workers is lower.
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Figure 1: The Allocation of Managerial Effort and Average Productivity
(Only low ability worker is socially connected to manager)
σ/b

ml=0 maximizes average productivity

ml=1 maximizes average productivity
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Notation
θ = cost of effort ratio (worker l/worker h)
k= strength of complementarity
σ = strength of social preferences
b= strength of managerial incentives
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Figure 2a: Worker Productivity by Connectivity
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Figure 2b: Worker Productivity by Connectivity
Managers Paid Performance Bonus
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Notes: A manager and given worker i are defined to be connected if they are either of the same nationality, live in the
same area, or are in the same arrival cohort. In each figure we plot the average productivity of a worker on field-days in
which she is not socially connected to any of her managers, against her average productivity on field-days in which she is
socially connected to at least one of her managers. These figures cover the subset of workers whom we observe being
connected and unconnected on different field-days within the same managerial incentive scheme. In Figure 2a, which is
based on field-days in which managers are paid a fixed wage, there are 92 such workers. In Figure 2b, which is based on
field-days on which managers are paid a performance bonus, there are 74 such workers.

Table 1: Descriptives on the Social Connectivity Between Workers and Managers, by Managerial
Incentive Scheme (Worker-Field-Day Level)
All observations are at the worker-field-day level
Means, standard deviation between workers in parentheses, and standard deviation within worker in brackets
Managerial Incentive Scheme

Share of managers connected to i (Cift)

Share of managers who are the same nationality as i

Share of managers who are in the same living area as i

Share of managers who are from the same arrival cohort as i

Fixed Wages

Performance Bonus

.433

.439

(.303)

(.295)

[.193]

[.150]

.310

.317

(.359)

(.327)

[.140]

[.111]

.132

.123

(.129)

(.172)

[.157]

[.129]

.047

.063

(.102)

(.111)

[.087]

[.077]

Notes: All variables are defined at the worker-field-day level. A manager and worker are defined to be resident in the same living area if they live within five
caravans from each other on the farm. A manager and worker are defined to be in the same arrival cohort if they have identification numbers within the
same ten digit window. A manager and given worker i are defined to be connected if they are either of the same nationality, live in the same area, or are in
the same arrival cohort. Each statistic is based on those workers that are connected to at least one manager along at least one of the three dimensions.
There are 267 such workers when managers are paid fixed wages, and 212 such connected workers when managers are paid a performance bonus. On
average, each worker is observed picking on 21 field-days when managers are paid fixed wages, and 29 field-days when managers are paid a performance
bonus. Overall there are 7818 worker-field-day observations when managers are paid fixed wages, and 4469 worker-field-day observations when managers
are paid a performance bonus.

Table 2: Worker Productivity (kg/hr), by Social Connectivity to Managers and Managerial
Incentive Scheme
All observations are at the worker-field-day level
Means, standard errors in parentheses
Managerial Incentive Scheme

Unconnected on field-day (DC ift=0)
Connected on field-day (DC ift=1)

Difference

Fixed Wages

Performance Bonus

Difference

6.95

9.11

2.15***

(.173)

(.568)

(.530)

8.27

9.23

.962***

(.244)

(.476)

(.324)

1.31***

.123

1.20**

(.257)

(.702)

(.616)

Notes: *** denotes significance at 1%, ** at 5%, and * at 10%. All variables are defined at the worker-field-day level. The standard errors are clustered
at the worker level. Productivity is measured as the number of kilograms of fruit picked per hour by the worker on the field-day. A manager and given
worker i are defined to be connected if they are either of the same nationality, live in the same area, or are in the same arrival cohort. A worker is
defined to be unconnected on the field-day if she is not socially connected to any of her managers that field-day. A worker is defined to be connected
on the field-day if she is socially connected to at least one of her managers. The standard errors on the differences, and difference-in-difference, are
estimated from running the corresponding least squares regression, allowing the standard errors to be clustered by worker.

Table 3: Social Connections and Managerial Incentives
Dependent Variable = Log of worker's productivity (kilograms picked per hour on the field-day)
Standard errors reported in parentheses, allowing for clustering at worker level (Columns 1 to 4), clustering at the field-date level in Column 5
(1) Any Managers
Connected To
Any managers connected to i , fixed wages for managers (DC ift)
Any managers connected to i , performance bonus for managers (DC ift)

(2) Share of Managers
Connected To

.133***
(.037)
-.115
(.082)

Share of managers connected to i , performance bonus for managers (C ift)
Share of managers of same nationality as i , fixed wages for managers

Share of managers living in same area as i , fixed wages for managers
Share of managers living in same area as i , performance bonus for managers
Share of managers of same arrival cohort as i , fixed wages for managers
Share of managers of same arrival cohort as i , performance bonus for managers

Adjusted R-squared
Number of observations (worker-field-day)

(5) Field-Date Fixed
Effects

.123***
(.037)
-.096
(.082)

.099**
(.045)
-.075
(.060)

.219**
(.089)

.174**
(.075)

.157***
(.047)
-.124
(.127)
.089**
(.044)
-.076
(.070)
.189**
(.081)
-.076
(.193)

Share of managers of same nationality as i , performance bonus for managers

Interactions of nationality x performance bonus dummy
Interactions of living site x performance bonus dummy
Interactions of arrival cohort x performance bonus dummy
Interactions of worker fixed effect x performance bonus dummy
Field-date fixed effects

(4) Heterogeneous Effects
of the Bonus on Workers

.041**
(.017)
.003
(.031)

Share of managers connected to i , fixed wages for managers (C ift)

Difference-in-difference estimate

(3) Type of Social
Connection

.039
(.031)

.249***
(.086)

Yes [.169]
Yes [.000]
Yes [.000]
No
No

Yes [.030]
Yes [.000]
Yes [.000]
No
No

Yes [.056]
Yes [.000]
Yes [.000]
No
No

No
No
No
Yes [.000]
No

No
No
No
Yes [.000]
Yes

.4124
12287

.4130
12287

.4135
12287

.4214
12287

.5463
12287

Notes: *** denotes significance at 1%, ** at 5%, and * at 10%. In Columns 1 to 4 the standard errors allow for clustering at the worker level. In Column 5 standard errors are clustered at the field-date level. All specifications control for worker, field, and manager fixed effects. The other
controls included in specifications 1 to 3 include the managerial performance bonus dummy, the worker's picking experience, the field life cycle, a time trend, and interactions between the performance bonus dummy and the worker's nationality, arrival cohort, and living site. The field
life cycle is defined as the nth day the field is picked divided by the total number of days the field is picked over the season. In Columns 4 and 5 these interactions are replaced by interactions of the worker fixed effect and the performance bonus dummy. Column 5 also controls for a
series of field-date fixed effects and hence the field life cycle and time trend are dropped from this specification. All continuous variables are in logarithms. A manager and given worker i are defined to be connected if they are either of the same nationality, live in the same area, or are
in the same arrival cohort. The sample is restricted to workers that are connected to at least one manager on at least one field-day. In Column 1 a worker is defined to be unconnected on the field-day if she is not socially connected to any of her managers that field-day, and the worker
is defined to be connected on the field-day if she is socially connected to at least one of her managers. The difference-in-difference estimate is the difference in the effect of social connections on worker productivity by managerial incentive scheme. At the foot of each column we
report the p-value on the F-test on the joint significance the interaction terms with the performance bonus dummy.

Table 4: Robustness of Results to Time Effects
Dependent Variable = Log of worker's productivity (kilograms picked per hour on the field-day)
Standard errors reported in parentheses, allowing for clustering at worker level
(1) Farm Level
Time Trend
Share of managers connected to i , fixed wages for managers
Share of managers connected to i , performance bonus for managers
Share of managers connected to i, fixed wages for managers x 2nd quarter dummy (31st May)
Share of managers connected to i, performance bonus for managers x 4th quarter dummy (29th July)

.152***
(.040)
-.071
(.086)
-.040
(.061)
-.116
(.099)

(4) Placebo
(2) Field Specific (3) Worker Specific
Bonus Based on
Time Trend
Time Trend
Field Life Cycle
.182***
(.059)
-.087
(.113)

.173**
(.087)
.435
(.399)

-.134
(.120)
-.117
(.195)

Share of managers connected to i , fixed wages for managers x field life cycle
Share of managers connected to i , performance bonus for managers x field life cycle

-.017
(.031)
-.141
(.105)

Share of managers connected to i , fixed wages for managers x days on farm for worker i
Share of managers connected to i , performance bonus for managers x days on farm for worker i

-.087
(.088)
-.033
(.149)

Share of managers connected to i, placebo bonus based on field life cycle = 0
Share of managers connected to i, placebo bonus based on field life cycle = 1

Interactions of nationality x performance bonus dummy
Interactions of living site x performance bonus dummy
Interactions of arrival cohort x performance bonus dummy
Adjusted R-squared
Number of observations (worker-field-day)

Yes
Yes
Yes

Yes
Yes
Yes

Yes
Yes
Yes

Yes
Yes
Yes

.4142
12287

.4269
12287

.4142
12287

.5618
1584

Notes: *** denotes significance at 1%, ** at 5%, and * at 10%. Standard errors allow for clustering at the worker level. All specifications control for worker, field, and manager fixed effects. The other controls included in each specification include the managerial
performance bonus dummy, the worker's picking experience, the field life cycle, and a time trend. The field life cycle is defined as the nth day the field is picked divided by the total number of days the field is picked over the season. All continuous variables are
in logarithms. A manager and given worker i are defined to be connected if they are either of the same nationality, live in the same area, or are in the same arrival cohort. The samples in Columns 1 to 3 are restricted to workers that are connected to at least
one manager on at least one field-day. In Column 1 the 2nd quarter dummy is defined to be equal to zero before May 31st and one thereafter. The 4th quarter dummy is defined to be equal to zero before July 29th and one thereafter. These dummy variables
split the pre and post bonus periods equally into two halves. In Column 3 the days on the farm for a worker are defined as the number of days elapsed since the worker first arrived on the farm. In Column 4 the placebo bonus dummy based on the field life
cycle is defined to be zero if the field is less than .53 of the way though its life cycle, and one otherwise. In this column the sample is restricted to fields that are only operated in the period when managers are paid a performance bonus (after June 27th). The
interaction terms at the foot of the table are defined with respect to the placebo bonus dummy variable in Column 4. The difference-in-difference estimate is the difference in the effect of social connections on worker productivity by managerial incentive
scheme.

Table 5: Robustness of Results to Using Alternative Samples of Workers
Dependent Variable = Log of worker's productivity (kilograms picked per hour on the field-day)
Standard errors reported in parentheses, allowing for clustering at worker level
(1) Available for Picking Three
(2) Pick Under Both Managerial
Weeks Either Side of the Change
Incentive Schemes
in Managerial Incentives
Share of managers connected to i , fixed wages for managers
Share of managers connected to i , performance bonus for managers

Difference-in-difference estimate
Interactions of nationality x performance bonus dummy
Interactions of living site x performance bonus dummy
Interactions of arrival cohort x performance bonus dummy
Adjusted R-squared
Number of observations (worker-field-day)

(3) Pick At Least Six Days
Under Both Managerial
Incentive Schemes

.145***
(.043)
-.053
(.114)

.130***
(.039)
-.108
(.083)

.158***
(.041)
-.083
(.088)

.198*
(.118)

.238***
(.088)

.241***
(.096)

Yes
Yes
Yes

Yes
Yes
Yes

Yes
Yes
Yes

.4219
8069

.4303
10542

.4278
8884

Notes: *** denotes significance at 1%, ** at 5%, and * at 10%. Standard errors allow for clustering at the worker level. All specifications control for worker, field, and manager fixed effects. The other controls included in each specification
include the managerial performance bonus dummy, the worker's picking experience, the field life cycle, and a time trend. The field life cycle is defined as the nth day the field is picked divided by the total number of days the field is picked
over the season. All continuous variables are in logarithms. A manager and given worker i are defined to be connected if they are either of the same nationality, live in the same area, or are in the same arrival cohort. The samples are all
restricted to workers that are connected to at least one manager on at least one field-day. The sample in Column 1 is further restricted to workers that are physically present on the farm three weeks wither side of the change in
managerial incentives (June 27th). The sample in Column 2 is further restricted to workers that are observed picking fruit on at least one day under both managerial incentive schemes. The sample in Column 3 is further restricted to
workers that are observed picking for at least six days under both managerial incentive schemes. The difference-in-difference estimate is the difference in the effect of social connections on worker productivity by managerial incentive
scheme.

Table 6: Rival Favors
Dependent Variable = Log of worker's productivity (kilograms picked per hour on the field-day)
Standard errors reported in parentheses, allowing for clustering at worker level
Any Managers Connected To
(1)
Any managers connected to i , fixed wages for managers

.041**
(.017)

Any managers connected to i , fixed wages for managers
x share of workers on the field that are socially connected to
Share of managers connected to i , fixed wages for managers
x average social connectivity of workers on the field-date to
Any managers connected to i , performance bonus for managers

.003
(.031)

.133***
(.037)

(4)
.318***
(.092)

-.168
(.123)
.273
(.215)

-.115
(.082)

-.119
(.223)

.030
(.685)

Share of workers on the field that are socially connected to
managers, fixed wages for managers
Share of workers on the field that are socially connected to
managers, performance bonus for managers
Average social connectivity of workers on the field-date to
managers, fixed wages for managers
Average social connectivity of workers on the field-date to
managers, performance bonus for managers

Adjusted R-squared
Number of observations (worker-field-day)

.191***
(.044)
-.261***
(.075)

(3)

-.551**
(.252)

Any managers connected to i , performance bonus for managers
x share of workers on the field that are socially connected to
Share of managers connected to i , performance bonus for managers
x average social connectivity of workers on the field-date to

Interactions of nationality x performance bonus dummy
Interactions of living site x performance bonus dummy
Interactions of arrival cohort x performance bonus dummy

(2)

Share of Managers Connected To

.045
(.067)
-.045
(.209)
.059
(.133)
-.268
(.324)
Yes
Yes
Yes

Yes
Yes
Yes

Yes
Yes
Yes

Yes
Yes
Yes

.4124
12287

.4131
12287

.4130
12287

.4131
12287

Notes: *** denotes significance at 1%, ** at 5%, and * at 10%. Standard errors allow for clustering at the worker level. All specifications control for worker, field, and manager fixed effects. The
other controls included in each specification include the managerial performance bonus dummy, the worker's picking experience, the field life cycle, and a time trend. The field life cycle is defined
as the nth day the field is picked divided by the total number of days the field is picked over the season. All continuous variables are in logarithms. A manager and given worker i are defined to be
connected if they are either of the same nationality, live in the same area, or are in the same arrival cohort. In Columns 1 to 4 the sample is restricted to workers that are connected to at least one
manager on at least one field-day. A worker is defined to be unconnected on the field-day if she is not socially connected to any of her managers that field-day, and the worker is defined to be
connected on the field-day if she is socially connected to at least one of her managers.

Table A1: Social Connections, Selection, and Managerial Incentives
Conditional logit estimates
Column 1: Dependent Variable = 1 if worker i is chosen to pick on day t in main site, 0 if worker is assigned to non-picking tasks
Column 2: Dependent Variable = 1 if worker i is unemployed on day t, 0 if assigned to non-picking tasks
Odd ratios reported, standard errors in parentheses, clustered by worker
Probability of Being
Selected to Pick
Performance bonus for managers
Performance bonus for managers x worker i is socially connected
Total yield in site 1
Total yield in site 2
Number of workers available to pick fruit
Worker i 's previous deviation from mean productivity

Log-likelihood
Number of observations (worker-day)

Probability of Being
Unemployed

1.34
(.495)
.524
(.214)
2.24***
(.153)
.883***
(.036)
.380***
(.037)
1.16*
(.091)

2.04*
(.764)
.605
(.253)
.802***
(.057)
.800***
(.032)
1.83***
(.178)
1.07
(.107)

-5186.8
15551

-3208.5
9808

Notes: *** denotes that the log odds ratio is significantly different from one at 1%, ** at 5%, and * at 10% levels. Conditional logit estimates are reported where
observations are grouped by worker. All continuous variables are divided by their standard deviations so that one unit increase can be interpreted as increase by
one standard deviation. A manager and given worker i are defined to be connected if they are either of the same nationality, live in the same area, or are in the
same arrival cohort. "Total yield" on the site is the total kilograms of the fruit picked on the site-day. The "number of workers available to pick fruit" is the total
number of individuals that are on the farm that day and are available for fruit picking. "Worker i 's previous deviation from mean productivity" is defined on the
last day the worker was selected to pick. We first take the deviation of the worker's productivity from the field average productivity on each field he picked on the
day he was last selected to pick, and then calculate a weighted average of this across all fields he worked on where the weights are based on the number of
pickers on the field. Worker i is defined to be unemployed on day t if she is present on the farm but is not assigned to any paid tasks.

Table A2: Allocation of Workers and Managers
Dependent Variable = Log (1+share of managers that are connected to worker i on field f day t )
Each cell reports the p-value of the test of the hypothesis that the coefficient on the interaction term is zero

Performance bonus for managers x field life cycle
Performance bonus for managers x trend

(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

(5)

(6)

(7)

.935

.414

.296

.653

.509

.771

.845

.219

.305

.293

.274

.231

.239

.192

.192

.184

.186

.186

.527

.587

.572

.557

.889

.975

.879

.185

.364

Performance bonus for managers x worker's experience
Performance bonus for managers x number of workers
Performance bonus for managers x number of managers
Performance bonus for managers x total hours worked

.952

Performance bonus for managers x total kilos of fruit picked
F-test of joint significance of all interaction terms

.346

.334

.617

.684

.665

.795

Notes: A manager and given worker i are defined to be connected if they are either of the same nationality, live in the same area, or are in the same arrival cohort.
Standard errors allow for clustering at the worker level. All specifications control for worker, field, and manager fixed effects. The other controls included in each
specification include the managerial performance bonus dummy, the worker's picking experience, the field life cycle, and a time trend. The field life cycle is defined as the
nth day the field is picked divided by the total number of days the field is picked over the season. The number of workers, number of supervisors, total kilos picked and
total hours worked are defined at the field-day level. All continuous variables are in logarithms. The null hypothesis for the F-test is that the coefficients of all the
interactions are equal to zero. There are 12287 worker-field-day level observations in each regression.

Table A3: Continuous Measures of Social Connections and Managerial Incentives
Dependent Variable = Log of worker's productivity (kilogram picked per hour on the field-day)
Standard errors reported in parentheses, allowing for clustering at worker level
Nationality
Share of managers of same nationality as i , fixed wages for managers
Share of managers of same nationality as i , performance bonus for managers

Living Area

.158***
(.047)
-.074
(.128)
.097**
(.044)
-.052
(.077)

Share of managers living in same area as i , fixed wages for managers
Share of managers living in same area as i , performance bonus for managers

.169*
(.097)
-.240*
(.133)

Share of managers of same arrival cohort as i , fixed wages for managers
Share of managers of same arrival cohort as i , performance bonus for managers

Difference-in-difference estimate
Interactions of nationality x performance bonus dummy
Interactions of living area x performance bonus dummy
Interactions of arrival cohort x performance bonus dummy
Adjusted R-squared
Number of observations (worker-field-day)

Arrival Cohort

.231*
(.140)

.149*
(.078)

.409**
(.170)

Yes [.089]
No
No

No
Yes [.000]
No

No
No
Yes [.000]

.4291
8238

.3722
8262

.4914
3980

Notes: *** denotes significance at 1%, ** at 5%, and * at 10%. Standard errors allow for clustering at the worker level. All specifications control for worker, field, and manager fixed effects. The other controls
included in each specification include the managerial performance bonus dummy, the worker's picking experience, the field life cycle, and a time trend. The field life cycle is defined as the nth day the field is
picked divided by the total number of days the field is picked over the season. All continuous variables are in logarithms. A manager and given worker i are defined to be connected if they are either of the same
nationality, live in the same area, or are in the same arrival cohort. In Column 1 the sample is restricted to workers that are sometimes connected to at least one manager on a field-day by nationality. In Column 2
the sample is restricted to workers that are sometimes connected to at least one manager on a field-day by living area. In Column 3 the sample is restricted to workers that are sometimes connected to at least
one manager on a field-day by arrival cohort. At the foot of each column we report the p-value on the F-test on the joint significance the interaction terms with the performance bonus dummy. The difference-indifference estimate is the difference in the effect of social connections on worker productivity by managerial incentive scheme.

Table A4: Spurious Measures of Social Connections and Managerial Incentives
Dependent Variable = Log of worker's productivity (kilogram picked per hour on the field-day)
Standard errors reported in parentheses, allowing for clustering at worker level
First Name Initial
Share of managers that have same first name initial as i , fixed wages for managers

Day of Month of Birth

Day of Week of Birth

-.010
(.050)

Share of managers that have same first name initial as i , performance bonus for managers

-.093
(.108)
.084

Share of managers that were born on the same day of the month as i , fixed wages for managers

(.069)
.142

Share of managers that were born on the same day of the month as i , performance bonus for managers

(.128)
-.085

Share of managers that were born on the same day of the week as i , fixed wages for managers

(.175)
-.306

Share of managers that were born on the same day of the week as i , performance bonus for managers

(.302)
Difference-in-difference estimate

.083
(.129)

-.058
(.140)

.221
(.203)
No

Interactions of first name initial x performance bonus dummy

Yes

No

Interactions of day of month of birth x performance bonus dummy

No

Yes

No

Interactions of day of week of birth x performance bonus dummy

No

No

Yes

Adjusted R-squared

.4563

.4249

.4524

Number of observations (worker-field-day)

5546

2274

2412

Notes: *** denotes significance at 1%, ** at 5%, and * at 10%. Standard errors allow for clustering at the worker level. All specifications control for worker, field, and manager fixed effects. The other controls included in each specification include the managerial
performance bonus dummy, the worker's picking experience, the field life cycle, and a time trend. The field life cycle is defined as the nth day the field is picked divided by the total number of days the field is picked over the season. All continuous variables are in
logarithms. A manager and given worker i are defined to be connected if they are either of the same nationality, live in the same area, or are in the same arrival cohort. In Column 1 the sample is restricted to workers that are sometimes connected to at least one
manager on a field-day by first name initial (A-Z). In Column 2 the sample is restricted to workers that are sometimes connected to at least one manager on a field-day by day of month of birth (1-31). In Column 3 the sample is restricted to workers that are
sometimes connected to at least one manager on a field-day by day of week of birth (Monday-Sunday). The difference-in-difference estimate is the difference in the effect of social connections on worker productivity by managerial incentive scheme.

